Moxa Industrial Linux 3.0 (Debian 11) Manual for Arm-based Computers

Version 1.0, January 2023

www.moxa.com/products



Moxa Industrial Linux 3.0 (Debian 11) Manual for Arm-based Computers

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Moxa Industrial Linux 3.0

Moxa Industrial Linux 3 (MIL3) is an industrial-grade Linux distribution developed and maintained by Moxa to address the security, reliability, and long-term support needs of industrial automation systems such as transportation, energy, oil and gas, and manufacturing.

MIL3 is based on Debian 11 with kernel 5.10 and integrated with several feature sets designed to strengthen and accelerate user application development as well as ensure system reliability and security.

Secure and Standard Models

MIL3 provides two security levels in the form of standard and secure models. The standard models come with the default Debian 11 security configuration and is for users who prefer the flexibility to build their own security solutions. The secure models of Moxa's Arm-based computers are secure-by-default and certified for IEC 62443-4-2 SL2 (security level 2). They come with Secure Boot, pre-defined security configuration, and additional security tools/utilities preinstalled

To identify the security model that you have, use the mx-interface-mgmt deviceinfo command to display the information. Only the secure models will have SECUREBOOT enabled.

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923: ~# mx-interface-mgmt deviceinfo
SERIALNUMBER=TBBBB1182827
MODELNAME=UC-8220-T-LX-US-S
SECUREBOOT=Enabled
```

The following table compares the main features in the standard and secure models.

	Standard Model	Secured Model
IEC 62443-4-2 SL2 Host Device Certified	N/A	\checkmark
Security Configuration	Default Debian configuration	IEC 62443-4-2 SL-2 Certified
Secure Boot	N/A	\checkmark
Boot from SD or USB	\checkmark	N/A (*1)
Disk Encryption	N/A	\checkmark
Install Image via TFTP	\checkmark	N/A (*2)
Secure Image Installation	N/A	\checkmark
Secure Update	\checkmark	\checkmark
Intrusion Detection	 ✓ (AIDE preinstalled without pre- defined monitoring database) 	 ✓ (AIDE with security monitoring database pre-defined)
Intrusion Prevention	✓ (Fail2ban)	✓ (Fail2ban)
Network Security Monitoring	✓ (Zeek)	✓ (Zeek)
Firewall	\checkmark (nftable disabled by default)	 ✓ (nftable with pre-configured security policy)
Security Diagnosis Tool (Moxa Guardian)	N/A	√
Security Event Audit Log	 ✓ (Audit service disabled by default) 	 ✓ (Audit service configured and running)
TPM 2.0	\checkmark	\checkmark
Backup, Decommission and Recovery	✓ (Moxa System Management)	✓ (Moxa System Management)
Network Management	 ✓ (Moxa Connection Management) 	✓ (Moxa Connection Management)
Computer Interface Management	✓ (Moxa Computer Interface Manager)	 ✓ (Moxa Computer Interface Manager)

*1: SD/USB is not secure as a boot source; *2: TFTP is not a secure protocol

Eligible Computing Platforms

This user manual is applicable to Moxa's Arm-based computers listed below and covers the complete set of instructions applicable to all the supported models. Detailed instructions on configuring advanced settings are covered in Chapter 3 to Chapter 6 of the manual.

You can order Moxa Arm-based computers with MIL3 preinstalled via the Moxa Computer Configuration System (CCS) using following model names:

Arm-based Computer Series	CTO Model Name
<u>UC-8200 Series</u>	UC-8210-T-LX-S (CTO)
	UC-8220-T-LX (CTO)
	UC-8220-T-LX-US-S (CTO)
	UC-8220-T-LX-EU-S (CTO)
	UC-8220-T-LX-AP-S (CTO)

Connecting to the Arm-based Computer

You will need another computer to connect to the Arm-based computer and log on to the command line interface. There are two ways to connect: locally through serial console or ethernet cable, or remotely via Secure Shell (SSH). Refer to the Hardware Manual to see how to set up the physical connections.

For default login username and password, please reference the <u>Default Credentials and Password Strength</u>.

The username and password are the same for all serial console and SSH remote log in actions. Root account login is disabled until you manually create a password for the account. The user **moxa** is in the **sudo** group so you can operate system level commands with this user using the **sudo** command. For additional details, see the <u>Sudo Mechanism</u> section in Chapter 7.



ATTENTION

For security reasons, we highly recommend that you disable the default user account and create your own user accounts.

Connecting through the Serial Console

This method is particularly useful when using the computer for the first time. The signal is transmitted over a direct serial connection, so you do not need to know either of its two IP addresses in order to connect to the Arm-based computer. To connect through the serial console, configure your PC's terminal software using the following settings.

Serial Console Port Settings		
Baudrate	115200 bps	
Parity	None	
Data bits	8	
Stop bits	1	
Flow Control	None	
Terminal	VT100	

Below we show how to use the terminal software to connect to the Arm-based computer in a Linux environment and in a Windows environment.

Linux Users

NOTE

These steps apply to the Linux PC you are using to connect to the Arm-based computer. Do NOT apply these steps to the Arm-based computer itself.

Take the following steps to connect to the Arm-based computer from your Linux PC.

- 1. Install **minicom** from the package repository of your operating system.
 - For Centos and Fedora: user@PC1:~# yum -y install minicom

For Ubuntu and Debian:

user@PC2:~# apt install minicom

- 2. Use the minicom -s command to enter the configuration menu and set up the serial port settings. user@PC1:~# minicom -s
- 3. Select **Serial port setup**.



4. Select **A** to change the serial device. Note that you need to know which device node is connected to the Arm-based computer.



- 5. Select **E** to configure the port settings according to the **Serial Console Port Settings** table provided.
- 6. Select Save setup as dfl (from the main configuration menu) to use default values.
- 7. Select **Exit from minicom** (from the configuration menu) to leave the configuration menu.
- 8. Execute **minicom** after completing the above configurations.

user@PC1:~# minicom

Windows Users

NOTE

These steps apply to the Windows PC you are using to connect to the Arm-based computer. Do NOT apply these steps to the Arm-based computer itself.

Take the following steps to connect to the Arm-based computer from your Windows PC.

 Download PuTTY <u>http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sqtatham/putty/download.html</u> to set up a serial connection with the Arm-based computer in a Windows environment. The figure below shows a simple example of the configuration that is required.

togony		
ategory: - Session - Logging - Terminal - Keyboard - Bell - Features - Window - Peatures - Window - Appearance - Behaviour - Translation - Colours - Connection - Data - Proxy - SSH - Selat - Selat - Telnet - Rlogin - SUPDUP	Basic options for your Pu Specify the destination you want to Serial line COM1 Connection type: SSH Serial Other: Load, save or delete a stored sess Saved Sessions Serial console Default Settings SSH Serial console	Speed 115200

2. Once the connection is established, the following window will open.

- 3. Select the **Serial** connection type and choose settings that are similar to the Minicom settings.
- 4. Enable **VT100 line drawing** option for the <u>MCM GUI configurator</u> to show correctly.

🕵 PuTTY Configuratio	n ?	\times
Category:		
Session Logging Terminal Keyboard Bell Features Window Appearance Behaviour Translation Selection Colours Connection Data Proxy SSH Serial Telnet Rlogin SUPDUP	Options controlling character set translation Character set translation Remote character set UTE3 (Codepages supported by Windows but not listed here, such as CP866 on many systems, can be entered manually) Treat CJK ambiguous characters as wide Caps Lock acts as Cyrillic switch Adjust how PuTTY handles line drawing characters Handling of line drawing code points Poor man's line drawing (+, - and [) Font has XWindows encoding Use font in both ANSI and OEM modes Use font in OEM mode only Enable VT100 line drawing even in UTF-8 mode	▼
About Help	Open Cancel	

Connecting via the SSH

The Arm-based computer supports SSH connections remotely or over an Ethernet network. If you are connecting the computer using an Ethernet cable, refer to the following IP addresses information

Ethernet Port	Configuration	IP Address
LAN 1 (*)	IDHCP (DHCP client)	Assigned by DHCP server. Link-local IP addresses will be assigned when DHCP server is not available
LAN 2	Static IP	192.168.4.127

*LAN 1 is by default for DHCP/link-local IP configuration and is managed by <u>Moxa Connection Manger</u> (<u>MCM</u>).

NOTE

Be sure to configure the IP address of your notebook/PC's Ethernet interface on the same subnet as the LAN port of Arm-based computer you plan to connect to. For example, 192.168.4.**126** for LAN2.

Linux Users



NOTE

These steps apply to the Linux PC you are using to connect to the Arm-based computer. Do NOT apply these steps to the Arm-based computer itself.

Use the **ssh** command from a Linux computer to access the computer's LAN2 port.

user@PC1:~ ssh moxa@192.168.4.127

Type **yes** to complete the connection.

The authenticity of host '192.168.3.127' can't be established. RSA key fingerprint is 8b:ee:ff:84:41:25:fc:cd:2a:f2:92:8f:cb:1f:6b:2f. Are you sure you want to continue connection (yes/no)? yes_

To connect using LAN1, you need to know the IP address.



ATTENTION

Regenerate SSH key regularly

In order to secure your system, we suggest doing a regular SSH-rekey, as shown in the following steps:

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ c	cd /etc/ssh
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ s	sudo rm /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ s	sudo dpkg-reconfigure openssh-server
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ s	sudo systemctl restart ssh

Select "keep the local version currently installed" following is prompt during rekey process



For more information about SSH, refer to the following link.

https://wiki.debian.org/SSH

Windows Users



NOTE

These steps apply to the Windows PC you are using to connect to the Arm-based computer. Do NOT apply these steps to the Arm-based computer itself.

Take the following steps from your Windows PC.

Click on the link <u>http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/download.html</u> to download PuTTY (free software) to set up an SSH console for the Arm-based computer in a Windows environment. The following figure shows a simple example of the configuration that is required.



Enable VT100 line drawing option for the MCM GUI configurator to show correctly

Reputition Putty Configuration	?	\times
Category:		
Session Connection Connection Connection Connection Connection Connection Connection Colours SSH Serial Telnet Rlogin SUPDUP	Options controlling character set translation Character set translation Remote character set UTFS (Codepages supported by Windows but not listed here. such as CP866 on many systems, can be entered manually) Treat CJK ambiguous characters as wide Caps Lock acts as Cyrillic switch Adjust how PuTTY handles line drawing characters Handling of line drawing code points Poor man's line drawing (, and l) Font has XWindows encoding Use font in OEM ANSI and OEM modes Use font in OEM mode only Conv and paste line drawing characters as look et enable VT100 line drawing even in UTF-8 mode	✓
About Help	Open Cance	

Managing User Accounts

Default User Account and Password Policy

The default login username and password of Moxa Industrial Linux are both **moxa** for the first-time login. You will be prompted to set a new password before you can continue to login.

- Default Username: moxa
- Default Password: moxa

Password Strength Requirements:

- At least 8 characters in length
- Dictionary checking is enabled to prevent the use of common passwords

To modify the password strength policy, edit the **/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/00-moxa-standardpwquality.conf** file to configure the policy.



NOTE

Click the following link for more information on the password strength configuration. <u>https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/libpwguality-common/pwguality.conf.5.en.html</u>

For bootloader administrator password configuration, refers to the **bootloader configuration** section.

Creating and Deleting User Accounts



ATTENTION

DO NOT disable the default account before creating an alternative user account.

You can use the **useradd** and **userdel** commands to create and delete user accounts. Be sure to reference the main page of these commands to set relevant access privileges for the account. Following example shows how to create a **test1** user in the **sudo** group whose default login shell is **bash** and has home directory at **/home/test1**:

moxa@ moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# sudo useradd -m -G sudo -s /bin/bash test1

To change the password for test1, use the **passwd** option along with the new password. Retype the password to confirm the change.

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# sudo passwd test1
New password:
Retype new password:
passwd: password updated successfully

To delete the user test1, use the userdel command.

moxa@ moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo userdel test1

Modifying User Accounts

You can use the **usermod** commands to create and modify the user account settings. Some examples of commonly used settings are listed here, including adding a user to a group, locking an account, activating an account and setting the password expiration date for the account.

1. Adding user test1 to the user group Moxa

moxa@ moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo usermod -a -G Moxa test1

- 2. Disabling or locking the user account test1 moxa@ moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo usermod -L test1
- 3. Activating the user account test1
 moxa@ moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo usermod -U test1
- 4. Set a password expire date of 2023-11-01 for the user account test1. moxa@ moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo usermod -e 2023-11-01 test1

NOTE

Refers to below link for complete usage of usermod https://linux.die.net/man/8/usermod

Changing the Password

You can use the **passwd** commands to change the password of a user account. Changing the password will not have any impact on other functionalities.

An example of changing the password for user account test1.

```
moxa@ moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo passwd test1
New password:
Retype new password:
passwd: password updated successfully
```

Querying the System Image Version

Use the mx-ver command to check the system image version on your Arm-based computer.



Querying the Device Information

Use the **#** mx-interface-mgmt deviceinfo command to retrieve general information for your Moxa Arm-based Computer

Command and Usage	Description
deviceinfo	 Shows the following device information: Serial number (S/N) Model name SECUREBOOT (Enabled/Disabled)
moxa@moxa-tbbbb118282	7:~\$ mx-interface-mgmt deviceinfo

MODELNAME=UC-8220-T-LX-US-S

SECUREBOOT=Enabled

Determining Available Drive Space

To determine the amount of available drive space, use the **df** command with the **-h** option. The system will return the amount of drive space broken down by file system. Here is an example:

<pre>moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ sudo df -h</pre>					
Filesystem	Size	Used	Avail	Use%	Mounted on
devtmpfs	485M	0	485M	0%	/dev
tmpfs	497M	7.1M	490M	2%	/run
/dev/mmcblk0p2	984M	150M	780M	17%	/boot_device/p2
/dev/mmcblk0p3	5.9G	39M	5.5G	1%	/boot_device/p3
/dev/mmcblk0p4	240M	2.8M	221M	2%	/var/log
/dev/loop0	147M	147M	0	100%	/boot_device/p2/lower
overlay	5.9G	39M	5.5G	1%	
/dev/mmcblk0p1	54M	15M	36M	30%	/boot_device/p1
tmpfs	497M	0	497M	0%	/dev/shm
tmpfs	5.0M	0	5.0M	0%	/run/lock
tmpfs	497M	0	497M	0%	/sys/fs/cgroup
tmpfs	100M	0	100M	0%	/run/user/1000

Shutting Down the Device

To shut down the computer, first disconnect the power source. When the computer is powered off, main components such as the CPU, RAM, and storage devices are powered off, although an internal clock may retain battery power.

You can use the Linux command **shutdown** to close all software running on the device and halt the system. However, main components such as the CPU, RAM, and storage devices will continue to be powered after you run this command.

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923: ~# sudo shutdown -h now

In this chapter, we describe how to configure the basic settings of Moxa Arm-based computers, including using the bootloader menu, configuring the network connections and power-saving settings, and localizing the computer. The instructions in this chapter cover all functions supported in Moxa Arm-based computers. Before referring to the sections in this chapter, ensure that they are applicable to and are supported by the hardware specification of your Arm-based computer.

Bootloader Configuration

Accessing the Bootloader Configuration Menu

To access bootloader menu, you must first connect to Moxa Arm-based computer via its <u>serial console port</u>. After powering on the Arm-based computer, press **Ctrl + Backspace** or **DEL** to enter the bootloader configuration menu



NOTE

If you cannot enter the bootloader menu by pressing , replace the PuTTy tool with the Tera Term terminal console tool (detailed information is available at: https://ttssh2.osdn.jp/index.html.en.)



Production and Developer Mode

The configurable options and operations in bootloader menu of Standard and Secure model are different for security consideration. Below is an overview of configuration options provided in Bootloader.

The Secure Model's bootloader menu has two modes (**Production** and **Developer mode**) where the **Production Mode** is the default mode with security configuration configured to comply with IEC 62443-4-2 security level 2 standard. **Developer Mode** provides addition operation and configuration that should only be used during development stage or maintenance.

For **Secure Model**, the administrator password to access bootloader menu is set by default. The Default Administrator Password is the **unique Serial Number(S/N)** printed on the sticker of Moxa Arm-based computer

1. To switch to Developer Mode, run mx-bootloader-mgmt mode developer



2. To switch to Production Mode, use mx-bootloader-mgmt mode -production root@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# mx-bootloader-mgmt mode production Set device into production mode Done
Mode info: prod_mode=0
root@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# reboot

- 3. Reboot computer for setting to take effect
- 4. To check the current mode, run **mx-bootloader-mgmt mode info**

An overview of bootloader configuration options is listed in the following table:

Main Menu	Sub Menu	Secure Model		Standard Model
Main Menu	Sub Menu	Production	Developer	Production Mode
		Mode	Mode	Production Mode
	(0) Set to Default	N/A	N/A	\checkmark
(0) Boot Management	(1) Boot Option	N/A	N/A	\checkmark
	(2) Advance Boot Option	N/A	N/A	\checkmark
	(3) View Current Setting	N/A	N/A	~
	(0) Install System Image from TFTP	N/A	\checkmark	~
(1) Install System	(1) Install System Image from SD	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Image	(2) Install System Image from USB	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
	(3) TFTP Settings	N/A	\checkmark	\checkmark
(2) Admin Password	(0) Set to Default	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
	(1) Enable/Disable Admin Password	✓ (enabled)	✓ (enabled)	 ✓ (disabled by default)
	(2) Configure Admin Password	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
	(3) Configure Admin Password Policy	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
	(0) Set to Default	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
	(1) Configure Auto Reboot	✓ (enabled)	✓ (enabled)	✓ (disabled)
(2) Advence Cetting	(2) Configure Login Message	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
(3) Advance Setting	(3) Configure Invalid Login Attempts	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
	(4) Clear TPM	N/A	\checkmark	\checkmark
	(5) View Bootloader log	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
(3) Exit & Reboot	-	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
(4) Go to Linux	-	N/A	N/A	\checkmark

Boot Management

Boot Option

By default, Moxa Arm-based computers boot up from the embedded eMMC flash. Some models also provide an option to boot up from an external SD or USB.

The following is an example of changing first boot priority to SD card and setting the secondary boot option to SD card if the first option fails to boot.

- 1. Select (0) Boot Management > (1) Boot Option
- 2. Choose to first boot from an external storage.
- 3. Choose if the embedded storage should be disabled.

If the embedded storage is disabled, Moxa Arm-based computers will only attempt to boot from the SD card. If embedded storage is set to eMMC, the computers will try to boot from SD; if that fails, they will boot from eMMC.

4. Set the External Storage to the SD card

```
Model: UC-8220-T-LX-US-SBoot Loader Version: 3.0.0S04Build date: May 13 2022 - 14:23:10LAN1 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E1LAN2 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E1(0) Boot Management(1) Install System Image(2) Admin Password(3) Advance Setting(4) Exit and Reboot(5) Go To Linux
```

```
Command>>1
Boot Management : Default
Boot Order : Embedded First
Embedded Storage : eMMC
External Storage : Disabled
Would you like to configure the Boot Option?
0 - No, 1 - Yes (0-1, Enter to abort): 1
Set Boot Order:
0 - Embedded First, 1 - External First (0-1, Enter to abort): 1
Set Embedded Storage:
0 - Disabled, 1 - eMMC (0-1, Enter to abort): 1
Set External Storage:
0 - Disabled ,1 - SD (0-1, Enter to abort): 1
```

The table below lists all possible combinations of boot options configuration and the corresponding boot action

Set Boot Order	Set Embedded Storage	Set External Storage	Boot Action
0 – Embedded First	1 – eMMC	0 – Disabled	Boot from eMMC
1 – External First	0 – Disabled	1 – SD or 2 – USB	Boot from the external storage
0 – Embedded First	1 – eMMC		First boot from eMMC; if it fails,
			boot from the external storage
1 – External First	1 – eMMC	1 – SD or 2 – USB	Boot from the external storage; if
		1 - 30 01 2 - 030	this fails, boot from eMMC

Advance Boot Option

Allow advanced users to edit the **bootargs** and **bootcmd** parameters to customize the boot process.

- **bootargs:** Used to tell the kernel how to configure various device drivers and where to find the root filesystem.
- bootcmd: Bootloader will execute the commands listed sequentially. Commands should be separated by semicolons.

Installing the System Image

Installing System Image From TFTP

- 1. Prepare a TFTP server
- 2. Set up a TFTP server.
- 3. Make sure the image (*.img) file is in your TFTP server directory.



IMPORTANT!

Use this method to install a system image on your computer if the size of the image file is less than 2 GB. If the file size is larger than 2 GB, use the SD card or USB to install the system image.

4. Select **Install System Image > TFTP Settings** and configure the following:

- > The LAN port to be used for TFTP transfer
- Local IP address of LAN port

Current IP Address

- > TFTP server IP
- 5. Press ESC to exit and select Install System Image from TFTP.

If you want to change the TFTP IP address, enter 1 to set up the local LAN port IP address and the TFTP server IP address, and then choose an image (*.img) file.

```
Local IP Address : 192.168.1.2
Server IP Address : 192.168.2.3
```

```
Using LAN2 to download data.
Do you want to change the ip address?
0 - No, 1 - Yes(0-1, Enter to abort):1
Local IP Address : 192.168.31.134
Server IP Address : 192.168.31.132
Saving Environment to SPI Flash...
Erasing SPI flash...Writing to SPI flash...done
Valid environment: 2
System Image File Name (system image.img): IMG UC-8200 MIL3 V1.0.img
```

- 6. After the system image installation process is complete, unplug the power supply and reboot the system.
- After rebooting the system, you can use the following command to check if the system image is up-todate.

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo mx-ver
<u>UC-8220-T-LX-US-S MIL3 version</u> 1.0 Build 22052300
```

Installing the System Image From SD or USB

The system image on the Moxa Arm-based computers can be installed through an external SD or USB disk. Prepare a USB or SD disk in the FAT32 or ext4 format with the system image and plug it into the USB or SD port of the computer.

- 1. Select Install System Image > Install System Image from SD or Install System Image from USB
- 2. Type in the system image file name.

```
Model: UC-8220-T-LX-US-S
Boot Loader Version: 3.0.0S04
Build date: May 13 2022 - 14:23:10 Serial Number: TBBBB1182827
LAN1 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E1 LAN2 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E2
(0) Install System Image from TFTP (1) Install System Image from SD
(2) Install System Image from USB (3) TFTP Settings
Command>>2
```

System Image File Name (system image.img): IMG_UC-8200_MIL3_V1.0.img

NOTE

Make sure to put **the hash file of the system image** in the same folder as image as integrity validation is required

- 3. After the system image installation process is complete, unplug the power supply and reboot the system.
- 4. After rebooting the system, you can use the following command to check if the system image is up-todate.

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo mx-ver
UC-8220-T-LX-US-S MIL3 version 1.0 Build 22052300
```

Administrator Password

Enabling/Disabling Admin Password

For the **Secure Model**, the administrator password to access bootloader menu is set by default. The

Default Administrator Password is the **unique Serial Number(S/N)** printed on the sticker of Moxa Armbased computer. For **Standard Model**, the bootloader menu is not protected by password by default. To enhance the security of your Moxa Arm-based computer, it is strongly recommended to setup an administrator password if there is physical unauthorized access is possible. To setup an administrator password, follow the below procedures:

- 1. Select Admin Password > Enable/Disable Admin Password.
- Select 1 to setup an administrator password. If 0 (disable) is selected, the currently set password will be cleared.
- 3. Enter the password you would like to set twice; the password strength requirement is at least 8 characters in length.

```
Model: UC-8220-T-LX-US-S
Boot Loader Version: 3.0.0S04
Build date: May 13 2022 - 14:23:10
                                     Serial Number: TBBBB1182827
LAN1 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E1
                                     LAN2 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E2
 (0) Set to Default
                                        (1) Enable/Disable Admin Password
                                        (3) Configure Admin Password Policy
 (2) Configure Admin Password
Command>>2
Current Mode: Disabled
0 - Disable, 1 - Enable (0-1, Enter to abort): 1
The current password is empty, please set one.
Enter the Administrator password
Enter current password: *******
Admin Password Policy:
- Minimum length: 8
Enter new password: *******
Retype password: *******
Password set successfully
Password status : Enabled.
```

4. Once Administrator password is set, password authentication is required when accessing bootloader menu.

```
DRAM: 1 GiB

MMC: OMAP SD/MMC: 0, OMAP SD/MMC: 1, OMAP SD/MMC: 2

Net: cpsw0, cpsw1

Non-security model.

Model: 0x02

2.0 TPM (device-id 0x15D1, rev-id 16)

TPM2 Init OK!

TPM2 Startup (1) OK!

Press <DEL> To Enter BIOS configuration Setting

Enter the Administrator password

Enter current password: *******
```

WARNING

It is important to save the password in a secure location. If the password is lost and access to bootloader menu is needed, you will have to contact Moxa technical support to send your Arm-based computer to Moxa for password reset.

Configuring the Admin Password Policy

To change the administrator password, select **Admin Password > Configure Admin Password** and follows the on-screen instructions. Changing the password will not have any impact on functionalities.

Model: UC-8220-T-LX-US-S Boot Loader Version: 3.0.0S04 Build date: May 13 2022 - 14:23:10 Serial Number: TBBBB1182827 LAN1 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E1 LAN2 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E2
(0) Set to Default(1)Enable/Disable Admin Password(2) Configure Admin Password(3)Configure Admin Password Policy
<pre>Command>>3 Current setting: Admin Password Policy: Minimum length: 8 ************************************</pre>
 0 - No, 1 - Yes (0-1, Enter to abort): 1 Minimum length (6-16, Enter to abort): 6 Minimum numeric numbers (0-16, Enter to abort): 1 Minimum lowercase or uppercase letters combined (0-16, Enter to abort): 1

Minimum Length

Setting	Description	Factory Default
Input from 6 to 16	It allows users to decide the minimum length of the password.	8

Minimum Numeric Numbers

Setting	Description	Factory Default
Input from 0 to 16	It allows users to decide the minimum of numeric number	0
	that the password must contain	5

Minimum Lowercase or Uppercase Letters Combined

Setting	Description	Factory Default
Input from 0 to 16	It allows users to decide the minimum letters (lowercase or	0
	uppercase combined) that the password must contain.	0

Configuring Admin Password

To change the administrator password, select **Admin Password > Configure Admin Password** and follows the on-screen instructions

Resetting the Admin Password to Default

If you lost your password, follow the below steps to reset the password to the factory default

1. After powering on the Arm-based computer, press **Ctrl + Backspace** or **DEL** to enter the Bootloader configuration menu that prompts for a password.

```
DRAM: 1 GiB
MMC: OMAP SD/MMC: 0, OMAP SD/MMC: 1, OMAP SD/MMC: 2
Net: cpsw0, cpsw1
Non-security model.
Model: 0x02
2.0 TPM (device-id 0x15D1, rev-id 16)
TPM2 Init OK!
TPM2 Startup (1) OK!
```

```
Press <DEL> To Enter BIOS configuration Setting
Enter the Administrator password
Enter current password:
```

 Immediately press and hold the FN button on the Moxa Arm-based computer for over 5 seconds will trigger the password reset process. You must complete this step within 10 seconds after step one for the reset process to initiate.

Login Policy

Invalid Login Attempts

This determines the **maximum consecutive failure login attempts** allowed during the specified **time period** and the duration to block users from accessing bootloader configuration menu when failure login attempts and time period is over the defined threshold.

To configure this policy, select **Advance Setting > Configure Invalid Login Attempts** and follow the onscreen instructions.

Model: UC-8220-T-LX-US-S Boot Loader Version: 3.0.0S04 Build date: May 13 2022 - 14:23:10 Serial Number: TBBBB1182827 LAN1 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E1 LAN2 MAC: 00:90:E8:A6:37:E2 _____ (0) Set to Default (1) Configure Auto Reboot (2) Configure Login Message (3) Configure Invalid Login Attempts (4) View Bootloader log _____ Command>>3 Current setting: [5] consecutive invalid login within [60] seconds will reboot and disable access to bootloader menu for [300] seconds. Do you want to configure the invalid login attempts setting? 0 - No, 1 - Yes (0-1, Enter to abort): 1 Input 0 to any of the configuration below will disable invalid login check Consecutive invalid login attempts (0-5, Enter to abort): Within how many seconds (0-60, Enter to abort): Disable access for how many seconds (0-900, Enter to abort):

Consecutive Invalid Login Attempts

Configuration	Setting	Factory Default
Consecutive invalid login attempts	Input from 0 to 5	0 (Standard model)
		5 (Secure model)
Within how many Seconds	Input from 0 to 60	0 (Standard model)
Within now many seconds		60 (Secure model)
Disable access for how many seconds	Input from 0 to 900	0 (Standard model)
Disable access for flow filally seconds	111put 110111 0 to 900	300 (Secure model)

NOTE

Input 0 to any of the above configuration will disable the invalid login check.

Auto Reboot After Inactivity

This determines the time period for auto reboot when users do not do any action.

To set the time period, select (2) Advance Setting > (1) Configure Auto Reboot and follow the onscreen instructions.

Setting	Description	Factory Default
Input from 0 to 900	This determines the time period for auto reboot when users	0 (Standard model)
(seconds)	do not do any action	900 (Secure model)

Login Banner Message

This allows users to customize the login message before prompting the administrator password.

To configure the message, select **Advance Setting > Configure Login Message** and follow the on-screen instructions.



Clearing the TPM Module

Clearing the TPM will erases information stored on the TPM. You will lose all created keys and access to data encrypted by these keys.

To clear the TPM, select **Advance Setting > Clear TPM** and follow the directions.

Localizing Your Arm-based Computer

Adjusting the Time

The Arm-based computer has two time settings. One is the system time, and the other is the RTC (Real Time Clock) time kept by the Arm-based computer's hardware. Use the **date** command to query the current system time or set a new system time. Use the **hwclock** command to query the current RTC time or set a new RTC time.

Use the date MMDDhhmmYYYY command to set the system time:

MM = Month **DD** = Date **hhmm** = hour and minute moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo date 102900282021
Fri 29 Oct 2021 12:28:00 AM GMT

Use the following command to set the RTC time to system time:

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo hwclock -w
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo hwclock
2021-10-28 16:25:04.077432+00:00

•

NOTE

Click the following links for more information on date and time:

https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/system-administrator/ch-sysadmin-time.html

https://wiki.debian.org/DateTime

NTP Time Synchronization

The Moxa Industrial Linux (MIL) uses Network Time Security (NTS) to secure NTP, which provides a handshake (TLS) before using a NTP server and authentication of the NTP time synchronization packets using the results of the TLS handshake.

The default NTP client in MIL is **Chrony**. MIL disabled NTP server without NTS support by default and uses the following public NTP servers that support NTS.

- <u>Cloudflare</u>
- <u>Netnod</u>
- <u>System76</u>
- <u>PTB</u>

The default server list is configured in the /etc/chrony/sources.d/moxa-nts.sources file.

<pre># prefer nts over ntp server</pre>
server time.cloudflare.com nts iburst prefer
server sth1.nts.netnod.se nts iburst prefer
server sth2.nts.netnod.se nts iburst prefer
server virginia.time.system76.com nts iburst prefer
server ohio.time.system76.com nts iburst prefer
server oregon.time.system76.com nts iburst prefer
server ptbtime1.ptb.de nts iburst prefer
server ptbtime2.ptb.de nts iburst prefer
server ptbtime3.ptb.de nts iburst prefer

The configuration file for Chrony is at /etc/chrony/chrony.conf.

The following example show some basic functions to monitor the current status of the Chrony's chronyc tool and make changes if necessary.

- 1. Check the time synchronization status between the local system and reference server using the command:
 - # chronyc tracking

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~\$ chronyc tracking			
Reference ID		A29FC801 (time.cloudflare.com)	
Stratum		4	
Ref time (UTC)		Sun Jul 31 18:27:42 2022	
System time		0.000334575 seconds slow of NTP time	
Last offset		+0.000226902 seconds	
RMS offset		0.005672113 seconds	
Frequency		27.766 ppm fast	
Residual freq		-0.065 ppm	
Skew		3.403 ppm	
Root delay		0.203054637 seconds	
Root dispersion		0.006750254 seconds	

```
Update interval : 517.4 seconds
Leap status : Normal
```

Check the time source configured in the /etc/chrony/chrony.conf file using the # chronyc sources command.

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~\$ chr	ronyo	c sou	urces		
MS Name/IP address St	trati	ım Po	oll Rea	ach La	stRx Last sample
====					
<pre>^+ ohio.time.system76.com</pre>	2	9	377	147	+18ms[+18ms] +/- 141ms
^+ oregon.time.system76.com	2	9	377	203	+14ms[+14ms] +/- 137ms
^- ptbtime1.ptb.de	1	9	21	682	-2780us[-2417us] +/- 166ms
^- ptbtime2.ptb.de	1	9	21	674	-5243us[-4882us] +/- 169ms
^- ptbtime3.ptb.de	1	9	21	687	+17ms[+17ms] +/- 192ms
^+ sth1-ts.nts.netnod.se	1	9	377	220	-12ms[-12ms] +/- 162ms
^- sth2-ts.nts.netnod.se	1	8	377	91	-3843us[-3843us] +/- 171ms
<pre>^* time.cloudflare.com</pre>	З	9	377	230	+13ms[+13ms] +/- 129ms
^+ virginia.time.system76.c>	2	9	377	226	-8753us[-8753us] +/- 116ms

3. Manually synchronize the time using the **# chronyc makestep** command.

NOTE

For additional details on Chrony, check the following links: <u>https://linux.die.net/man/8/chronyd</u> <u>https://linux.die.net/man/1/chronyc</u>

Setting the Time Zone

There are two ways to configure the Moxa Arm-based computer's time zone. One is using the **TZ** variable. The other is using the **/etc/localtime** file.

Using the TZ Variable

The format of the TZ environment variable looks like this:

TZ=<Value>HH[:MM[:SS]][daylight[HH[:MM[:SS]]][,start date[/starttime], enddate[/endtime]]]

Here are some possible settings for the North American Eastern time zone:

- 1. TZ=EST5EDT
- 2. TZ=EST0EDT
- 3. TZ=ESTO

In the first case, the reference time is GMT and the stored time values are correct worldwide. A simple change of the TZ variable can print the local time correctly in any time zone.

In the second case, the reference time is Eastern Standard Time and the only conversion performed is for Daylight Saving Time. Therefore, there is no need to adjust the hardware clock for Daylight Saving Time twice per year.

In the third case, the reference time is always the time reported. You can use this option if the hardware clock on your machine automatically adjusts for Daylight Saving Time or you would like to manually adjust the hardware time twice a year.

moxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ TZ=EST5EDT
moxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ export TZ

You must include the TZ setting in the **/etc/rc.local** file. The time zone setting will be activated when you restart the computer.

Hours From Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)	Value	Description
0	GMT	Greenwich Mean Time
+1	ECT	European Central Time
+2	EET	European Eastern Time
+2	ART	
+3	EAT	Saudi Arabia
+3.5	MET	Iran
+4	NET	
+5	PLT	West Asia
+5.5	IST	India
+6	BST	Central Asia
+7	VST	Bangkok
+8	СТТ	China
+9	JST	Japan
+9.5	ACT	Central Australia
+10	AET	Eastern Australia
+11	SST	Central Pacific
+12	NST	New Zealand
-11	MIT	Samoa
-10	HST	Hawaii
-9	AST	Alaska
-8	PST	Pacific Standard Time
-7	PNT	Arizona
-7	MST	Mountain Standard Time
-6	CST	Central Standard Time
-5	EST	Eastern Standard Time
-5	IET	Indiana East
-4	PRT	Atlantic Standard Time
-3.5	CNT	Newfoundland
-3	AGT	Eastern South America
-3	BET	Eastern South America
-1	CAT	Azores

The following table lists other possible values for the TZ environment variable:

Using the localtime File

The local time zone is stored in the **/etc/localtime** and is used by GNU Library for C (glibc) if no value has been set for the TZ environment variable. This file is either a copy of the **/usr/share/zoneinfo/** file or a symbolic link to it. The Arm-based computer does not provide **/usr/share/zoneinfo/** files. You should find a suitable time zone information file and write over the original local time file in the Arm-based computer.

4. Using and Managing Computer Interfaces

In this chapter, we include more information on the Arm-based computer's interfaces, such as the serial interface, storage, diagnostic LEDs, and the wireless module. The instructions in this chapter cover all functions supported in Moxa's Arm-based computers. Before referring to the sections in this chapter, make sure that they are applicable to and are supported by the hardware specification of your Arm-based computer.

Moxa Computer Interface Manager (MCIM)

On many occasions, there isn't one standard method to access and configure specific interfaces on Moxa Arm-based computers because the hardware varies. Hence, programing across different Moxa Arm-based computer models can be difficult and time consuming. The goal of MCIM is to provide a unified software interface to access and configure non-standard computer interfaces. For example, MCIM can change the serial port interface mode (e.g., RS-232, RS-485-2W,RS-422). However, configuring the serial port baud rate is not possible in MCIM because Linux provides a standard method to set the baud rate

MCIM is a command-line interface (CLI) Moxa utility designed to access and manage Moxa Arm-based computers' interfaces. Use the **#** mx-interface-mgmt command to display the menu page.

Configuring the Log Level

To set the log level of MCIM, edit the configuration file /etc/moxa/MoxaComputerInterfaceManager/MoxaComputerInterfaceManager.con

Кеу	Value	Description
LOG LEVEL	debug/info/warn/error	The log-level settings for the logs generated by MCIM for
	debug/into/warn/error	debugging and troubleshooting. The default level is "info"

Device Information

Use the **# mx-interface-mgmt deviceinfo** command to get information on your Moxa Arm-based computer.

Command and Usage	Description
	Show the following information:
deviceinfo	Serial number (S/N)
	Model name
	 SECUREBOOT (Enabled / Disabled)

LED Indicators



Use **# mx-interface-mgmt led** command to get the list of controllable LEDs on your Arm-based computer. In the following example, the returned NAME "L1" refers to the yellow LED for cellular signal, labeled "L1" on the device. For **LEDs** with **multiple colors** such as USR (yellow and green), 2 LED names will appears (USR_Yellow and USR_Green). For this type of LEDs, you must set the state of a color to "off" before setting another color to "on" or "blinking".

moxa@moxa-tk	<pre>pzkb1090923:~\$ mx-interface-</pre>	mgmt led
NAME	LABEL	STATE
WЗ	W3:yellow:signal	off
USR_Yellow	USR:yellow:programmable	off
USR_Green	USR:green:programmable	off
L1	L1:yellow:signal	off
W1	W1:yellow:signal	off
L2	L2:yellow:signal	off
W2	W2:yellow:signal	off
L3	L3:yellow:signal	off

The MCIM commands for LED indicator controls are listed in the following table:

Command and Usage	Description
led	 Shows the following information for all controllable LEDs Name (as labeled on the device) Model series of the device Color of the LED Description of the LED LED state (on/off/heartbeat)
led < led_name >	Show the above information of a specified LED
led < led_name > get_state	Get the current state (on/off/heartbeat) of a specified LED
led < led_name > set_state < led_state >	Set the state of a specified LED. Value of <state> can be on, off, or heartbeat</state>

An example of changing the current state of USR LED from **yellow** (steady) to **yellow** (blinking) is given below:

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# sudo mx-interface-mgmt led USR_Yellow
NAME=SYS
LABEL= USR_Yellow
STATE=on
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# sudo mx-interface-mgmt led USR_Yellow set_state
heartbeat
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# sudo mx-interface-mgmt led USR_Yellow get_state
heartbeat
```

Storage and Partitions

Use **#** mx-interface-mgmt disk and **#** mx-interface-mgmt partition commands for managing the storage device and partitions.

Command and Usage	Description
disk	 Show the following information of all embedded and external storage Name (e.g., eMMC, USB, SD) Device node (e.g., /dev/mmcblk0) System disk (Y/N), if 'Y', it is the disk with MIL installed. Number of partitions Automount enabled/disabled (Y/N)
disk < disk_name >	 Show the following information of a specified storage device Name (e.g., eMMC, USB, SD) Device node (e.g., /dev/mmcblk0) System disk (Y/N), if 'Y', it is the disk with MIL installed. Partition name and device node Automount enabled/disabled (Y/N)
disk < disk_name >	Set a specified external storage device (e.g., USB, SD) to
set_automount < value >	automount when attach to device; <value> is true/false</value>
partition	 Show the following information for partitions on all embedded and external storage devices: Name (e.g., eMMC_p1, eMMC_p2, USB_p1) Device node (e.g., /dev/mmcblk0p1) Partition mounted (Y/N) Partition mount point (e.g., /boot_device/p1) Filesystem (e.g., ext4, FAT32)
<pre>partition <partition_name></partition_name></pre>	Show the above information of a specified partition
partition < partition_name > mount	Mount a specified partition
partition < partition_name > unmount	Unmount a specified partition

For example, to query available storage device and set USB storage drive to automount, use the following command:

moxa@	moxa-tbzkb1090	923:~\$ mx-inte	rface-mgmt	disk		
NAME	DEVICE	SYSTEM_DISK	NUMBER_OF_	PARTITIONS	AUTOMOUNT_SETTING	
USB	/dev/sdb	N	1		false	
eMMC	/dev/mmcblk0	Y	4		false	
moxa@	moxa-tbzkb1090	923:~\$ sudo mx	-interface-	mgmt disk U	SB set_automount tru	e

To query available partitions and mount the partition 1 of the USB storage drive, use the following command:

moxa@moxa	a-tbzkb1090923:~#	mx-interface-	-mgmt part	ition
NAME	DEVICE	IS_MOUNTED	FS_TYPE	MOUNTPOINT
eMMC_p1	/dev/mmcblk0p1	Y	ext4	/boot_device/p1
eMMC_p2	/dev/mmcblk0p2	Y	ext4	/boot_device/p2
еММС_рЗ	/dev/mmcblk0p3	Y	ext4	/boot_device/p3
eMMC_p4	/dev/mmcblk0p4	Y	ext4	/boot_device/p4
USB_p1	/dev/sdb1	N	N/A	N/A
moxa@moxa NAME=USB DEVICE=/d IS_MOUNTH FS_TYPE=v	a-tbzkb1090923:~\$ _p1 dev/sdb1 ED=Y		2	partition USB_p1 mount ition USB_p1



WARNING

Setting external storage device to automount may expose your device to cybersecurity risks. It is strongly recommended that you not automount storage device unless your device is placed is in a highly secure environment.

Serial Port

The serial ports support RS-232, RS-422, and RS-485 2-wire operation modes with flexible baudrate settings. The default operation mode is RS-232.

Use the **#** mx-interface-mgmt serialport command to query and configure the operation mode for the serial ports.

Command and Usage	Description
serialport	 Shows the following information for all serial ports on the device: Name (as labeled on device) Device node (e.g., /dev/ttyM0)
serialport <serialport_name></serialport_name>	 Shows the following information for a specified serial port: Name (as labeled on device) Device node (e.g., /dev/ttyM0) Supported operation modes (e.g., RS-232, RS-485-2W, RS-422) Supported baudrates Current operation mode configured
serialport <serialport_name> get_interface</serialport_name>	Gets the current operation mode for a specified serial port
<pre>serialport <serialport_name> set_interface <serial_interface></serial_interface></serialport_name></pre>	Sets the operation mode for a specified serial port.

Changing the Serial Port Operation Mode

For example, to change the mode of COM1 serial port from default RS-232 mode to the RS-422 mode, use the following command:

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# mx-interface-mgmt serialport
NAME DEVICE
COM1
     /dev/ttyM0
COM2
     /dev/ttyM1
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# mx-interface-mgmt serialport COM1
NAME=COM1
DEVICE=/dev/ttyM0
SUPPORTED INTERFACES=RS-232,RS-485-2W,RS-422
SUPPORTED BAUDRATES=50,300,600,1200,1800,2400,4800,9600,19200,38400,57600,11520
0,230400,460800,921600
INTERFACE=RS-232
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# sudo mx-interface-mgmt serialport COM1 set interface
RS-422
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~# mx-interface-mgmt serialport COM1 get_interface
RS-422
root@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~#
```

Changing Other Serial Interface Settings with STTY

The stty command is used to view and modify the serial terminal settings.

Displaying All Settings

Use the following example to display all serial terminal settings of COM1 serial port.

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:/# mx-interface-mgmt serialport
NAME DEVICE
COM1
     /dev/ttyM0
COM2 /dev/ttyM1
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:/# sudo stty -a -F /dev/ttyM0
speed 9600 baud; rows 0; columns 0; line = 0;
intr = ^C; quit = ^\; erase = ^?; kill = ^U; eof = ^D; eol = <undef>;
eol2 = <undef>; swtch = <undef>; start = ^Q; stop = ^S; susp = ^Z; rprnt = ^R;
werase = ^W; lnext = ^V; flush = ^O; min = 1; time = 0;
-parenb -parodd cs8 hupcl -cstopb cread clocal -crtscts
-ignbrk -brkint -ignpar -parmrk -inpck -istrip -inlcr -igncr icrnl ixon -ixoff
-iuclc -ixany -imaxbel -iutf8
opost -olcuc -ocrnl onlcr -onocr -onlret -ofill -ofdel nl0 cr0 tab0 bs0 vt0 ff0
isig icanon iexten echo echok -echonl -noflsh -xcase -tostop -echoprt
echoctl echoke
```

Configuring Serial Settings

The following example changes the baudrate to 115200.

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ sudo stty 115200 -F /dev/ttyM0

Check the settings to confirm that the baudrate has changed to 115200.

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~$ sudo stty -a -F /dev/ttyM0
speed 115200 baud; rows 0; columns 0; line = 0;
intr = ^C; quit = ^\; erase = ^?; kill = ^U; eof = ^D; eol = <undef>;
eol2 = <undef>; swtch = <undef>; start = ^Q; stop = ^S; susp = ^Z; rprnt = ^R;
werase = ^W; lnext = ^V; flush = ^0; min = 1; time = 0;
-parenb -parodd cs8 hupcl -cstopb cread clocal -crtscts
-ignbrk -brkint -ignpar -parmrk -inpck -istrip -inlcr -igncr icrnl ixon -ixoff
-iuclc -ixany -imaxbel -iutf8
opost -olcuc -ocrnl onlcr -onocr -onlret -ofill -ofdel nl0 cr0 tab0 bs0 vt0 ff0
isig icanon iexten echo echoe echok -echonl -noflsh -xcase -tostop -echoprt
echoctl echoke
```

NOTE

Detailed information on the **stty** utility is available at the following link: <u>https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/coreutils/stty.1.en.html</u>

Ethernet Interface

Use **#** mx-interface-mgmt ethernet command to display information on the Ethernet ports.

Command and Usage	Description
ethernet	 Show the following information of all ethernet ports on the device. Name (as labeled on device) Network interface name (eth0, eth1, etc.)
ethernet <ethernet_name></ethernet_name>	Show the above information of a specified ethernet port

<pre>moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ mx-interface-mgmt ethernet</pre>
NAME DEVICE_NAME
LAN1 eth0
LAN2 eth1
<pre>moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ mx-interface-mgmt ethernet LAN1</pre>
<pre>moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ mx-interface-mgmt ethernet LAN1 NAME=LAN1</pre>

Serial Console Interface

Use the **# mx-interface-mgmt console** command to display the serial console port information.

Command and Usage	Description
	Show the following information for the console port.
console	 Name (as labeled on the device)
	 Device node (e.g., /dev/ttyS0)
Console <console_name></console_name>	Show the above information of a specified serial console interface

Following is an example of showing the console port device node

root@moxa	a-tbzkb1090923:~#	mx-interface-mgmt	console
NAME	DEVICE		
Console	/dev/ttyS0		
root@moxa	a-tbzkb1090923:~#		

Digital Input/Output (DIO)

Use the **#** mx-interface-mgmt dio command to query and configure the state for each digital input/output (DIO) interface, and also configure the hook script.

The predetermined state of the digital output interface is high (open circuit).

Command and Usage	Description
dio	 Shows the following information of all DIO interfaces: Name (as labeled on device) State (high/low) Event Path of falling edge script Path of rising edge script
dio <dio_name></dio_name>	Shows the above information of a specified DI or DO interface
dio <dio_name> get_state</dio_name>	Gets the current state (high/low) of a specified DI or DO interface
dio <dio_name> set_state <dio_state></dio_state></dio_name>	Sets the state (high/low) of a specified DO interface
dio <dio_name> add_hook <edge> <path></path></edge></dio_name>	Adds an edge script (rising/falling) from a specified path to an interface
dio <dio_name> remove_hook <edge></edge></dio_name>	Removes the edge script (rising/falling) of an interface

Buzzer

Use the **#** mx-interface-mgmt buzzer command to query and set the state for buzzer alarm in Moxa Arm-based computers with a buzzer.

Command and Usage	Description
buzzer	 Show the following information of all buzzers Name State (on/off)
buzzer <buzzer_name></buzzer_name>	Show the following information of a specified buzzer Name State (on/off)
buzzer <buzzer_name> get_state</buzzer_name>	Get the current state (on/off) of a specified buzzer
buzzer <buzzer_name> set_state</buzzer_name>	Set the state (on/off) of a specified buzzer

Cellular Module Interface

Use # mx-interface-mgmt cellular command to query and manage cellular module(s)

Command and Usage	Description
cellular	 Show the following information for all cellular modules. Name (e.g., Cellular1) Network interface name (wwan0, wwan1, etc.) Cellular module detected (true/false)
cellular <name></name>	 Show the detail information of a specified cellular module Name (e.g., Cellular1) Network interface name (wwan0, wwan1) Cellular module detected (true/false) QMI Port (e.g., /dev/cdc-wdm0) AT Port (e.g., /dev/ttyUSB4) GPS Port (e.g., /dev/ttyUSB3) if GPS is supported Cellular module power status (on/off) Number of available SIM slots on the device The SIM slot # that is currently used by the cellular module Note: SIM slot # correspond to the labeled slot # on the device
cellular <name> get_power</name>	Get the cellular module power status (on/off).
cellular <name> set_power <power_state></power_state></name>	Set the cellular module power status (on/off). Note: Module will power-on when device reboot
cellular <name> get_sim_slot</name>	Get the SIM slot # that is currently used by the cellular module
cellular <name> set_ sim_slot <sim_slot></sim_slot></name>	Set the SIM slot # used by cellular module. Module power off/on is required for SIM slot changed to take effect. Note: SIM slot # will be set to default (slot 1) when the device reboot

NOTE

- 1. Some cellular modules may not support power on/off or SIM slot control.
- 2. If you are using Moxa Connection Manager (MCM) to manage the cellular connection, do not use set_power or sim_slot commands as they might interrupt MCM's network failover/failback operations.

An example of using MCIM to query the cellular module information and changing the SIM slot # use by the module from slot 1 to 2 is given below:

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~$ mx-interface-mgmt cellular
NAME DEVICE_NAME DEVICE_DETECTED
Cellular1 wwan0 true
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~$ mx-interface-mgmt cellular Cellular1
NAME=Cellular1
DEVICE_NAME=wwan0
QMI_PORT=/dev/cdc-wdm0
```

```
AT_PORT=/dev/ttyUSB4
GPS_PORT=/dev/ttyUSB3
DEVICE_DETECTED=true
POWER=on
SIM_SLOT_NUMBER=2
SIM_SLOT=1
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~$ mx-interface-mgmt cellular Cellular1 set_sim_slot 2
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~$ mx-interface-mgmt cellular Cellular1 get sim slot 2
```

Wi-Fi Module Interface

Use the **# mx-interface-mgmt wifi** command to query and manage Wi-Fi modules.

Command and Usage	Description	
wifi	 Shows the following information of all Wi-Fi modules. Name (e.g., WiFi1) Network interface name (wlan0, wlan1) Wi-Fi module detected (true/false) 	
wifi <name></name>	Shows the above information for a specified Wi-Fi module	
wifi <name> get_power</name>	Gets the Wi-Fi module power status (on/off).	
wifi <name> set_power</name>	Set the Wi-Fi module power status (on/off).	
<power_state></power_state>	Note: The module will power-on when the device reboots.	



NOTE

Some Wi-Fi modules may not support power on/off control.

Socket Interface

Use the **# mx-interface-mgmt socket** command manage the Mini PCI-E sockets on the Moxa Armbased Computer

Command and Usage	Description
socket	List all the available sockets' name (e.g., Socket1, Socket2)
socket <socket_name></socket_name>	 Shows the following information for a specified Mini PCI-E socket Name (e.g., Socket1, Socket2) Power status (on/off) Number of available SIM slots if a cellular module is insert to this Mini PCI-E socket Get the SIM slot # that is currently used by the cellular module on this Mini PCI-E socket Note: SIM slot # correspond to the labeled slot # on the device.
socket < socket_name> get_power	Gets the power status (on/off) for a specified Mini PCI-E socket
socket <name> set_power</name>	Set the power status (on/off) for a specified Mini PCI-E socket.
<power_state></power_state>	Note: The socket will power-on when the device reboots.

CAN Port

The CAN ports on Moxa's Arm-based computers support CAN 2.0A/B standard.

Configuring the Socket CAN Interface

The CAN ports are initialized by default. If any additional configuration is needed, use the ip link command to check the CAN device.

To check the CAN device status, use the ip link command.



CAN Bus Programming Guide

The following code is an example of the SocketCAN API, which sends packets using the raw interface.

CAN Write

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/can.h>
#include <linux/can/raw.h>
int main(void)
    int s;
    int nbytes;
    struct sockaddr can addr;
    struct can_frame frame;
    struct ifreq ifr;
    char *ifname = "can1";
    if((s = socket(PF CAN, SOCK RAW, CAN RAW)) < 0) {
        perror("Error while opening socket");
        return -1;
    strcpy(ifr.ifr name, ifname);
    ioctl(s, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr);
    addr.can family = AF CAN;
    addr.can ifindex = ifr.ifr ifindex;
    printf("%s at index %d\n", ifname, ifr.ifr ifindex);
    if(bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {</pre>
        perror("Error in socket bind");
        return -2;
    frame.can id = 0x123;
    frame.can_dlc = 2;
    frame.data[0] = 0x11;
    frame.data[1] = 0x22;
    nbytes = write(s, &frame, sizeof(struct can_frame));
    printf("Wrote %d bytes\n", nbytes);
    return 0;
```
CAN Read

The following sample code illustrates how to read the data.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/can.h>
#include <linux/can/raw.h>
   int nbytes;
   struct sockaddr_can addr;
   struct can_frame frame;
   struct ifreq ifr;
   char *ifname = "can0";
   if((s = socket(PF CAN, SOCK RAW, CAN RAW)) < 0) {
       perror("Error while opening socket");
       return -1;
   strcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname);
   ioctl(s, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr);
   addr.can_family = AF_CAN;
   addr.can_ifindex = ifr.ifr_ifindex;
   printf("%s at index %d\n", ifname, ifr.ifr_ifindex);
   if(bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {</pre>
       perror("Error in socket bind");
       return -2;
   nbytes = read(s, &frame, sizeof(struct can frame));
    if (nbytes < 0) {
        perror("Error in can raw socket read");
        return 1;
   if (nbytes < sizeof(struct can frame)) {</pre>
        fprintf(stderr, "read: incomplete CAN frame\n");
        return 1;
   printf(" %5s %03x [%d] ", ifname, frame.can id, frame.can dlc);
    for (i = 0; i < frame.can dlc; i++)</pre>
       printf(" %02x", frame.data[i]);
   printf("\n");
    return 0;
```

After you use the SocketCAN API, the SocketCAN information is written to the paths: /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/can* and /proc/sys/net/ipv4/neigh/can*

Push-button

Getting the Button List and Status

Use **# mx-interface-mgmt** button command to display the available buttons and the buttonconfigured actions.

Command and Usage	Description		
	Show the following information for all buttons on the device:		
	Name (as labeled on device)		
button	 Action (default/user-defined/disabled) 		
	Default: Button behavior is default		
	User-defined: The button behavior has been customized by the user		
	Disabled: The button has no function when pushed		
button <name></name>	Show the above information for a specified button		

Following is an example of using MCIM to query an available button (FN button) of the UC-8200 series.

root@r	noxa-tbzkb1090923:~#	mx-interface-mgmt	button
NAME	Action		
FN	default		

Customize the Button Action

You can use the two scripts (default and custom) available in the following path to customize button actions: **/etc/moxa/MoxaComputerInterfaceManager/button-scripts/**. For example, in the UC-8200 series, the default script is "**uc8200-default.script**" and custom script is "**custom.script**".

By default, the FN button will load the default script when pressed. The default script will perform designed tasks based on the actions on the FN button. The following table gives a detailed description of the default script:

FN button Action	LED Indicator Status	Resulting Action
Press and hold FN button and release within 1s	SYS LED blinks	Device reboot
Press and hold FN button and release between 7s to 9s	 SYS LED blinks for 1s to 6s SYS LED is ON for 7s to 9s 	Reset to factory default
Press and hold FN button and release after 9s	 SYS LED blinks for 1s to 6s SYS LED is ON for 7s to 9s SYS LED is OFF after 9s 	Do nothing; cancel action

To customize the $\ensuremath{\textbf{FN}}$ button action, a configuration file at

/etc/moxa/MoxaComputerInterfaceManager/peripheral-settings.conf could be modified. The device needs to rebooted for the settings to take effect.

The **ServiceMode** parameter in the configuration file can have the following three values:

- 0: Disable the button (no action when pressed)
- 1: Run the default script
- 2: Run the custom script

NOTE

You must reboot the system for the settings to take effect.

An example of the settings in the **peripheral-settings.conf** file is shown below:

[Button/FN]		
ServiceMode=2		
[Disk/eMMC]		
AutoMount=false	e	
[Disk/SD]		
AutoMount=false	e	

```
[Disk/USB]
AutoMount=true
[SerialPort/COM1]
Interface=1
[SerialPort/COM2]
Interface=0
```

If **ServiceMode** is set to 2 (custom script), **/etc/moxa/MoxaComputerInterfaceManager/buttonscripts/custom.script** should be edited to add the desired actions. To make it easier to configure the actions in the script file, copy the content of the default script to custom script file and then make the required changes.

root@moxa-tbzkb1090923:/etc/moxa/MoxaComputerInterfaceManager/button-scripts# cp uc3100-default.script custom.script

Configuring the Real COM Mode

You can use Moxa's NPort series serial device drivers to extend the number of serial interfaces (ports) on your V2406C computer. The NPort comes equipped with COM drivers that work with Windows systems and TTY drivers for Linux systems. The driver establishes a transparent connection between the host and serial device by mapping the IP Port of the NPort's serial port to a local COM/TTY port on the host computer.

Real COM Mode also supports up to 4 simultaneous connections, so that multiple hosts can collect data from the same serial device at the same time.

One of the major conveniences of using Real COM Mode is that Real COM Mode allows users to continue using RS-232/422/485 serial communications software that was written for pure serial communications applications. The driver intercepts data sent to the host's COM port, packs it into a TCP/IP packet, and then redirects it through the host's Ethernet card. At the other end of the connection, the NPort accepts the Ethernet frame, unpacks the TCP/IP packet, and then sends it transparently to the appropriate serial device attached to one of the NPort's serial ports.

The Real COM driver is installed on the V2406C computer by default. You will be able to view the driver related files in the **/usr/lib/npreal2/driver** folder.

> mxaddsvr (Add Server, mapping tty port) > mxdelsvr (Delete Server, unmapping
tty port)

- > mxloadsvr (Reload Server) > mxmknod (Create device node/tty port)
- > mxrmnod (Remove device node/tty port)
- > mxuninst (Remove tty port and driver files)

At this point, you will be ready to map the NPort serial port to the system **tty** port. For a list of supported NPort devices and their revision history, click <u>https://www.moxa.com/en/support/search?psid=50278</u>.

Mapping TTY Ports

Make sure that you set the operation mode of the desired NPort serial port to Real COM mode. After logging in as a super user, enter the directory /usr/lib/npreal2/driver and then execute mxaddsvr to map the target NPort serial port to the host tty ports. The syntax of mxaddsvr command is as follows:

mxaddsvr [NPort IP Address] [Total Ports] ([Data port] [Cmd port])

The **mxaddsvr** command performs the following actions:

- 1. Modifies the npreal2d.cf.
- 2. Creates tty ports in the /dev directory with major & minor number configured in npreal2d.cf.
- 3. Restarts the driver.
- 1.

Mapping TTY Ports (automatic)

To map tty ports automatically, execute the **mxaddsvr** command with just the IP address and the number of ports, as shown in the following example:

cd /usr/lib/npreal2/driver
./mxaddsvr 192.168.3.4 16

In this example, 16 tty ports will be added, all with IP 192.168.3.4 consisting of data ports from 950 to 965 and command ports from 966 to 981.



ATTENTION

You must reboot the system after mapping tty ports with mxaddsvr.

Mapping TTY Ports (manual)

To map tty ports manually, execute the **mxaddsvr** command and specify the data and command ports as shown in the following example:

cd /usr/lib/npreal2/driver
./mxaddsvr 192.168.3.4 16 4001 966

In this example, 16 tty ports will be added, all with IP 192.168.3.4, with data ports from 4001 to 4016 and command ports from 966 to 981.



ATTENTION

You must reboot the system after mapping tty ports with mxaddsvr.

Removing Mapped TTY Ports

After logging in as root, enter the directory /usr/lib/npreal2/driver and then execute the **mxdelsvr** command to delete a server. The syntax of **mxdelsvr** is:

```
mxdelsvr [IP Address]
```

Example:

```
# cd /usr/lib/npreal2/driver
# ./mxdelsvr 192.168.3.4
```

The following actions are performed when the **mxdelsvr** command is executed:

- 1. Modify npreal2d.cf.
- 2. Remove the relevant tty ports from the /dev directory.
- 3. Restart the driver.

If the IP address is not provided in the command line, the program will list the installed servers and total ports on the screen. You will need to choose a server from the list for deletion.

5. Configuring and Managing Networks

Moxa Connection Manager (MCM)

MCM is a network management utility developed by Moxa to manage the LAN and WAN network on your Moxa Arm-based computer, including Wi-Fi, cellular, and ethernet interfaces. With MCM, you can easily fill in the connection profile and priority in the configuration file; then MCM will automatically connect and keep the connection alive. Following are the major features of MCM:

- Cellular, Ethernet and Wi-fi connection
- Connection auto keep-alive, failover, and failback
- DHCP server
- Data usage monitoring
- Cellular connection diagnosis tool
- Cellular modem and network information
- Cellular modem firmware upgrade with failback

Interface	Default Managed by MCM	Network Configuration
LAN1	Yes	 Set as DHCP WAN by default. After boot up, if LAN1 cannot obtain IP from DHCP server for 20 seconds, then link-local IP addresses is automatically assigned.
LAN2	No	Static IPv4, 192.168.4.127
Cellular/ Wi-Fi	No	Not configured

To run MCM, you must use root permission to run # mx-connect-mgmt

MOXA Connection Management Command-line Utility		
USAGE: mx-connect-mgmt	[SUBCOMMAND]	
FLAGS:		
	Prints help information Prints version information	
SUBCOMMANDS:		
configure	MOXA Connection Management via GUI dialog	
datausage	Show interface data usage information and related functions	
debug	and diagnose cellular connection	
help	Show the help menu	
ls	List available network interfaces	
modem	Upgrade cellular modem firmware	
nwk_status	Show network and modem's information and connection status	
reload	configuration files and restart interfaces	
start	to control interfaces	
stop	to control interfaces	
unlock_pin	Unlock SIM PIN for the specified interface	
unlock_puk	Unlock PUK and reset SIM PIN for the specified interface	
wifi —	Search Wi-Fi AP	

NOTE

By default, only LAN1 port is managed by MCM.

There are 2 types of configuration files for MCM. One is main configuration file to manage the interrelationship between each interface, and one configuration files per each network interfaces available on Moxa Arm-based computer

Config Type	Description	File Location	
Main Config.	Main configuration file which is to configure which network interface you would like MCM to manage and set the priority during failover/failback	/etc/moxa/MoxaConnectionManager/ MoxaConnectionManager.conf	
Interface Config.	Per interface configuration file which is to configure properties of individual interfaces. Such as APN, PIN code of cellular connection or SSID and password of Wi-Fi.	/etc/moxa/MoxaConnectionManager /interfaces/[interface name].conf	

NOTE

When modification is made to configuration file, you must use **#** mx-connect-mgmt reload to make the change effective.

Instead of modifying the configuration file directly, we highly recommend you use the **GUI Configurator** described in next section to configure MCM.

Setting Up MCM with GUI Configurator

GUI Configurator Overview

To configure the WAN network through ethernet, Wi-Fi or cellular interface on the V2406C computer, you can use the simple GUI dialog provided by using **#** mx-connect-mgmt configure command.

If you are using PuTTY, enable **VT100 line drawing** option under **Windows > Translation** for the GUI to show correctly



1. Go to the main page.



Figure 5.1 – Main page

Option Name	Description	
Configure Network Interface	Configure network setting for	
Configure Log Level	 Available syslog levels are ERR, WARN, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE MCM log is save in /var/log/syslog 	
Set to Default MCM Configuration	Set all configuration to default	

2. Configure network type for each interface and set the WAN connection priority for failover/failback.



Figure 5.2 – Configure network interface

Option Name	Description		
Configure Network Interfaces	 A list of available network interfaces will show, where you can set the network type for each interface. The options are: WAN - When set to WAN, this interface will be added to the default gateway list and allow MCM to apply automatic keep-alive and failover/failback control over it LAN - When set to LAN, MCM will connect this interface using the network attributes defined in Profile-1 and DHCP server can be enabled for this interface LAN Bridge - Bridge two or more LAN interfaces to construct a larger LAN Manual - When set to Manual, it allows the user to have total control over this interface. MCM will connect this interface one-time only network attributes defined in Profile-1. MCM will not set these interface as the default gateway nor apply connection keep-alive and failover/failback control over it. 		
Configure WAN Interface Priority	MCM will use the WAN interface set as 1st Priority as the default gateway. When the 1st priority interface becomes unavailable, MCM will automatically failover to the next priority interface.		
Enable/Disable Failback	When enabled, the backup connection will automatically failback to the higher priority connection when it became available again		
Failback Check Interval	This value determines how long (in seconds) the higher priority connection should maintain stability before MCM trigger the failback. The purpose is to avoid unstable connections causing frequent failover and failback		

3. Configure individual network interface.

Configure LAN2 Interfaces				
Space to t	coggle, Enter to confirm, ESC to go to the previous page			
1	Select Network Type for LAN2 [WAN]			
2	Enable/Disable Connection Keep-alive [Disabled]			
3	Configure Network Profile Priority [Profile-1, Profile-2]			
4	Configure Network Profile Retry Threshold [2]			
5	Configure Network Profile Timeout [10] Seconds			
	Network Profile :			
6	Add a New Profile			
7	Remove a Profile			
8	8 Profile-1			
9	Profile-2			
10	Profile-3			

Figure 5.3 –Configurable options for WAN interface

	Configure LAN2 Interfaces
Space to toggle	, Enter to confirm, ESC to go to the previous page
1	Select Network Type for LAN2 [LAN] Configure Network Profile Timeout [10] Seconds
3	Enable/Disable DHCP Server [Disabled]
	Network Profile :
4	Profile-1

Figure 5.4 –Configurable options for LAN interface

Option Name	Network Type	Description
Select Network Type	All	Available options are WAN/LAN/LAN Bridge/Manual/None
Enable/Disable Connection Keep-alive	WAN	You can enable this setting if a seamless failover experience is required, meaning if a backup interface is set to always keep- alive, then MCM can failover to a ready-to-use backup connection without the initialization downtime.

Option Name	Network Type	Description	
Configure Network Profile Priority	WAN	When the 1st priority WAN network's profile cannot connect or becomes unavailable, MCM will automatically failover to the next profile in this priority list <i>Note: network profile failback is currently not supported</i>	
Configure Network Profile Retry Threshold	WAN	This value determines the maximum attempts MCM will try to connect using the current WAN network profile before failover to the next profile in the priority list.	
Configure Network Profile Timeout	All	This value (in seconds) determines the maximum time MCM will try to connect using the current network profile before determining the connection is unavailable	
Bridge IPv4 Address	LAN-bridge	Assign a static IPv4 address for the bridged LAN interfaces	
Bridge IPv4 Subnet Mask	LAN-bridge	Assign a static IPv4 subnet mask for the bridged LAN interfaces	
Enable/Disable DHCP Server	LAN, LAN-bridge	Configure a specific LAN or bridged LAN interfaces as DHCP server	
Network Profile	WAN, LAN, Manual	 This section displays all network profile in a list with option to add, modify or remove a profile. If network type is set to LAN or Manual, only profile-1 be used because network profile failover is only available for WAN 	

4. Configure network profile of an interface.



Option Name	Interface	Description
Carfinana Madam	Cellular (WAN)	Configure cellular connection parameters including APN, SIM slot (which SIM slot number to use), PIN Code, Username, Password
Configure Modem Setting	Wi-Fi (WAN)	Configure Wi-Fi connection parameters including Mode (only Wi-Fi client mode is supported), SSID , and Password <i>Note: make sure to leave the password field empty if you are</i> <i>connecting to a public Wi-Fi without password</i>
Configure IP Method	All interfaces	Configure IP related parameters including protocol version (IPv4, IPv6 or IPv4v6) and IP assignment method (DHCP, auto*, static IP or Link-local)

Option Name	Interface	Description
Configure Keep-alive Check Method	All interfaces	 Select the method to check connection is alive Ping: Connection is only considered alive if pinging the target server specified is successful Check-ip-exist: As long as an IP is assigned to the interface (e.g., the base station assigns IP to the cellular modem or DHCP server assigns IP to LAN port), are considered connection is alive

* IP assignment method "auto" is for IPv6 only, which support Stateless Address Auto-Configuration (SLACC) and Stateless for DHCPv6.

Cellular and Wi-Fi Failover/Failback

One of the key features in MCM is WAN connection auto-failover, where you can configure multiple backup WAN networks. When the primary connection becomes unavailable, MCM will automatically fail over to the backup network depending on the priority you set. You can even configure the connection to fall back to the primary one when it is back online.

In below example, we will set Wi-Fi interface as the primary WAN network and Cellular(4G/LTE) as the backup. MCM will automatically switch to using Cellular(4G/LTE) when Wi-Fi is down and back to Wi-Fi when it is back online.

1. Run # mx-connect-mgmt configure to launch a simple GUI dialog configurator



- 2. Select "Configure Network Interfaces"
- 3. Set interface Cellular1 and WiFi1 both to WAN, and
- 4. Set WiFi1 as the 1st priority and Cellular1 as 2nd priority
- 5. Make sure Failback is enabled if you would like MCM to automatically switch back to Wi-Fi from cellular when it is back online.
- Failback Check Interval [30] seconds mean MCM will make sure Wi-Fi connection is alive and stable for 30 seconds before failback to use Wi-Fi as the primary connection (default gateway). The purpose is to avoid unstable connections causing frequent failover and failback.



- 7. Go to the interface configuration page of WiFi1 and Cellular1 (Figure 5.5 is an example of Cellular)
- The option "Enable/Disable Connection Keep-alive" is disabled by default. It means there will be a short period without network during Wi-Fi to cellular failover process since MCM will only initiate the cellular connection when failover is triggered.

You can enable this setting if a seamless failover experience is desired. When enabled, it allows MCM to failover to a ready-to-use backup connection without the initialization downtime.

- 9. MCM also supports network profile failover. For example, on a Moxa Arm-based computer with dual SIM slots, you can set up two profiles for cellular interface; each uses a different SIM slot and SIM card.
 - Network Profile Priority: in this example, MCM will use profile-1 by default and failover to use profile-2 when it cannot establish a connection with profile-1.
 - Network Profile Timeout and Retry Threshold: in this example, MCM will try to connect with profile-1 two times, each with a maximum of 90 seconds timeout before switching to profile-2.
- 10. You can modify the default profile-1 and profile-2 or add/remove a profile.

Configure Cellular1 Interfaces					
Space to toggle, Enter to confirm, ESC to go to the previous page 1 Select Network Type for Cellular1 [WAN] 2 Enable/Disable Connection Keep-alive [Disabled] 3 Configure Network Profile Priority [Profile-1, Profile-2] 4 Configure Network Profile Retry Threshold [2] 5 Configure Network Profile Timeout [90] Seconds Network Profile : 6 Add a New Profile 7 Remove a Profile 8 Profile-1 9 Profile-2	8 9				
<pre></pre>					

Figure 5.6 – Interface configuration page of Cellular1

- 11. Go to profile configuration page.
- 12. Configure the cellular modem related attribute. In this example, a SIM card in SIM slot 1 with PIN code "9917" and APN "internet" is used for Profile-1
- 13. Select the IP protocol generation. IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4v6 are the available options.
- 14. Select how MCM determine the connection is alive. Currently, only "ping' method is supported for WAN network. In this example, following configuration are set for Profile-1 of Cellular1 interface
 - > MCM will ping the IP of Google public DNS every 700 seconds
 - MCM will try to ping the target host maximum 3 times (Retry Threshold) before concluding profile-1 cannot connect. For each ping attempt, MCM will consider ping fails if server doesn't response in 3 seconds (Ping timeout)
- 15. Once completed the configuration, exit MCM and select save and reload configuration file for the configuration to take effect

Space/Enter to confir	Configure Cellularl Profile-1 m, ESC to go to the previous page Configure Modem Setting [APN [internet] I SIM Slot [1] I PIN Code [0000] I Username [] I Password []	12
6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Configure IP Method [IPV4] Configure Keep-alive Check Method [ping IPv4 Ping Target Host [8.8 IPv6 Ping Target Host [200 Ping Timeout [3] Configure Keep-alive Check Configure Keep-alive Retry	.8.8] 1:4860:4860::8888] Interval [300]
	< CK > < Exit >	< Help >

Figure 5.7-network profile configuration page of Cellular1 interface

Checking the Network Status

Checking the Interface and Connection Status

- Use # mx-connect-mgmt nwk_info [Interface name] to check the interface and connection status
- Use # mx-connect-mgmt nwk info [Interface name]

	: # sudo mx-connect-mgmt nwk_info Cellular1
Interface Name	: Cellular1
Enabled	: true
WAN Priority	: 2
Device Name	: wwwan0
Device Type	: Modem
Network Type	: WAN
Mac Address	:
IPv4 Method	: dhcp
IPv6 Method	
Modem State	
Radio Access Tech	
Signal Strength	
Operator Name	
Unlock Retries	
	: 1
IMSI	: 466924253357038
Connection Status	
Default Route	
IPv4 Address	
Netmask	: 255.255.255.252
	: 10.224.91.85
Primary DNS	• 168 95 1 1
Secondary DNS	
IPv6 Address	:
Netmask	
Gateway	
Primary DNS	
Secondary DNS	

Figure 5.8 -an example of nwk_info result of interface Cellular1

Most of the data fields and values are self-explanatory. Below are additional details to some of the data fields:

Fields	Available Interface	
Enabled	True: This interface is managed by MCM	Wi-Fi, Ethernet,
Lilableu	False: This interface is not managed by MCM	Cellular
WAN priority	The WAN priority set in Figure 5.2	Wi-Fi, Ethernet,
	The WAN priority set in Figure 5.2	Cellular
Notwork Type	WAN/LAN/Manual/None according to the set value in Figure 5.2	Wi-Fi, Ethernet,
Network Type	WAN/LAN/Manual/None according to the set value in <u>Figure 5.2</u>	Cellular

Fields	Description	Available Interface
Modem State	 Not Ready: The cellular modem can't be detected, or some configuration is not set correctly in MCM configuration files. Initializing: The cellular is initializing SIM PIN Locked: SIM PIN is locked; you can unlock with unlock_pin command SIM PUK Locked: SIM PUK is locked; you can unlock with unlock_puk command Radio Power Off: The cellular modem is entering flight mode Radio Power On: The cellular modem is exiting flight mode Searching Base Station: The cellular modem has exited flight mode and searching for base-station Attached to Base Station: The cellular modem is registered with a network provider but without data connections. Connecting: The cellular modem is connecting Connected: The cellular modem is connected No SIM: SIM card is missing or malfunctioning 	Cellular only
Radio Access Tech	GSM/GSM COMPACT/UMTS/LTE, etc.	Cellular only
Signal Strength	 None/Very Poor Poor Fair Good Excellent Note: see cellular signal strength for defined criteria 	Cellular only
SIM Slot	The SIM slot number being used	Cellular only
Connection Status	 Initializing: Initializing network connection Device Ready: Detected the network interface is ready Connecting: Connecting according to setting in profile Configuration Error: Profile configuration error Disabling: Stopping the connection Disabled: When an interface is not managed by MCM, or MCM service is stopped Connected: Connection is "working". The criteria for "working" are determine by the Keep-alive Check Method in Figure 5.5. For example, if method is set to ping, the connection is consider working if ping is successful Unable to connect: The network profile is set correctly but the connection is not working determined by the Keep-alive Check Method in Figure 5.5 Reconnecting: Connection is being reconnecting 	
Default Route	 True: This interface is currently being used as default route False: This interface is not the default route 	Wi-Fi, Ethernet, Cellular

Cellular Signal Strength

Below are the criteria that MCM uses to determine the signal strength for 3G(UMTS) and 4G(LTE):

Using 4G(LTE) signal level as an example:

- For the signal level "Excellent", both RSSI and EC/IO need to meet the defined criteria in below table
- If the RSSI value meets the "Excellent" criteria but EC/IO meets only the "Good" criteria, then the MCM will show "Good" signal level

3G(UMTS) Signal Level	RSSI (dBm)	EC/IO (db)	4G(LTE) Signal Level	RSRP (dBm)	RSSNR (db)
Excellent	>=-77	>=-6	Excellent	>=-85	>=13
Good	>=-87	>=-10	Good	>=-95	>=5
Fair	>=-97	>=-14	Fair	>=-105	>=1
Poor	>=-107	>=-20	Poor	>=-115	>=-3
None/Very Poor	<-107	<-20	None/Very Poor	<-115	<-3

Monitoring the Data Usage

Use **#** mx-connect-mgmt datausage to check the data usage of a specified interface between a specified start and end date

```
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:# sudo mx-connect-mgmt datausage -h
mx-connect-mgmt-datausage
Show interface data usage information and related functions
USAGE:
   mx-connect-mgmt datausage [FLAGS] [OPTIONS] [interface]
FLAGS:
    -h, --help
                   Prints help information
    -r, --reset
                  data usage database
OPTIONS:
    -s, --since <date>
                          Sets the begin date of data usage cumulative period,
                           expected date format YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM or YYYY-MM-DD
    -t, --to <date>
                          Sets the end date of data usage cumulative period,
                            expected date format YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM or YYYY-MM-DD
ARGS:
    <interface>
```

Below is an example of how to check the data usage of Wi-Fi interface between 2022/7/3 and 2022/7/4

```
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:# sudo mx-connect-mgmt datausage --since 2022-07-03 --to
2022-07-04 WiFi1
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:
rx: 21884544 bytes
tx: 116086 bytes
```

Upgrading the Cellular Modem Firmware

Use **#** mx-connect-mgmt modem upgrade [Interface name] will check and install the latest cellular modem firmware tested by Moxa from Moxa APT server.

- Your cellular network will be down temporary during the upgrade and the connection will be reconnected by MCM after the upgrade is complete
- You can also upgrade the firmware locally by specifying a file path following **-F** or **--filepath** option
- By default, firmware downgrade is not allowed and not recommended. If you insist to downgrade the firmware, you can add -f flag to force the downgrade.
- You can use mx-connect-mgmt nwk_info [interface name] -a command to check the current cellular modem firmware version
- MCM will perform auto-reinstallation if upgrade fails.

```
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo mx-connect-mgmt modem upgrade -h
mx-connect-mgmt-modem-upgrade
Upgrade modem FWR
USAGE:
    mx-connect-mgmt modem upgrade [FLAGS] [OPTIONS] [interface]
FLAGS:
    -f force upgrade FWR
    -h, --help Prints help information
OPTIONS:
    -F, --filepath <filename> Sets the FWR file path
ARGS:
    <interface>
```

An example of automatically updating the cellular modem firmware from Moxa APT server is given below:

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo mx-connect-mgmt modem upgrade Cellular1

An example of manually updating the cellular modem firmware by specifying a firmware file is given below:

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo mx-connect-mgmt modem upgrade Cellular1 -F /etc/ firmware/Telit-LE910C4-EU-Info-1.1.0

An example given below indicates how to manually force the cellular modem firmware update even if the current firmware is newer than the provided firmware:

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo mx-connect-mgmt modem upgrade Cellular1 -f -F
/etc/ firmware/Telit-LE910C4-EU-Info-1.0.0

Cellular Network Diagnosis

Use **#** mx-connect-mgmt debug to perform diagnosis on the cellular network if you have trouble getting it to connect. The diagnosis tool can identify common issues such has missing antenna, weak signal strength, SIM card pin code error, SIM locked, etc.



Using API to Retrieve the MCM Status

MCM provides C application programming interfaces (APIs) for developer to retrieve various network and interface status from MCM

Please refers to following link for the C API document

https://moxa.gitlab.io/open-source/linux/gitbook/moxa-connection-manager-api-document/

To integrating your applications securely with the MC C API, you should follow the below guideline:

- 1. Confirm that the return value of the API is 0 and the returned struct pointer is not NULL to avoid using the wrong memory address.
- 2. Always free the structure pointer returned by the API to avoid memory leak.

6. System Installation and Update

In this chapter, we will introduce how to install and update Moxa Industrial Linux and the bootloader.

Installing Moxa Industrial Linux

Using a TFTP Server From Bootloader Menu

Refers to instruction in Accessing Bootloader Menu section



NOTE

TFTP update is disabled in Secure model by default due to TFTP is not a secure transmission protocol.

Using a USB/SD From Bootloader Menu

Refers to instruction in Accessing Bootloader Menu section

Automatic Installation From a USB or SD

Beside manually installing the system image from bootloader menu, you can also trigger the image installation process within the operating system using mx-bootloader-mgmt image_auto_install command. Once this process is triggered, the Arm-based computer will automatically install the specified system image in the USD or SD attached to the system. The new image will be available upon the next system boot-up.



NOTE

The format supported for USB and SD are FAT32 and ext4, respectively.

Command	Description	
-d,disk	Display the name of the external storage (e.g., USB, SD) where the image file is located. You can use the mx-interface-mgmt disk command to query the external	
	storage name.	
-f,file	Display the name of the image file in the external storage	
	Display the names of the image file and external storage configured for auto-install	
-i,info	upon next boot-up	
-r,remove	Remove the auto-installation configuration	
-h,help	h,help Display the available commands with a brief description	
-v,version	version Display the version of mx-image-auto-install-tool	

Following is an example of the automatic installation of the system image from a USB device:

1. Use **mx-interface-mgmt** disk command to check the name of available storage device name.

moxa@n	moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090918:~# sudo mx-interface-mgmt disk					
NAME	DEVICE	SYSTEM_DISK	NUMBER_OF_PARTITIONS	AUTOMOUNT_SETTING		
USB	/dev/sda	N	1	false		
eMMC	/dev/mmcblk0	Y	4	false		

2. Mount the USB if it is not already mounted. Refer to Storage and Partition section for detail.

<pre>moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ sudo mx-interface-</pre>			rface-mgm	t partition
NAME	EVICE	IS_MOUNTED	FS_TYPE	MOUNTPOINT
eMMC_p1	/dev/mmcblk0p1	Y	ext4	/boot_device/p1
eMMC_p2	/dev/mmcblk0p2	Y	ext4	/boot_device/p2
еММС_рЗ	/dev/mmcblk0p3	Y	ext4	/boot_device/p3
eMMC_p4	/dev/mmcblk0p4	Y	ext4	/boot_device/p4
USB_p1	/dev/sdb1	N	N/A	N/A

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ sudo mx-interface-mgmt partition USB p1 mount

3. Configure an auto-installation event in partition 1 of the USB device with the image file IMG_UC-8200_MIL3_V1.0_Build_22053011_ImageBuild_220530_133813.img:

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090918:~# sudo mx-bootloader-mgmt image_auto_install -d USB
-f

IMG_UC-8200_MIL3_V1.0_Build_22053011_ImageBuild_220530_133813.img

*

NOTE

Ensure that the image file and sha256 hash files is available in partition 1 of USB or SD before configuring the event.

4. Reboot the system to trigger the auto installation of the system image from the USB device.

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090918:~# sudo reboot

Updating Moxa Industrial Linux Using SecureApt

Moxa Arm-based computers support **SecureApt**, which uses a GPG public key system to ensure the integrity and authenticity of patches are validated before download, and x.509 certification authentication for secure transmission via HTTPS. The private key pair of the GPG key for the Moxa APT repository is stored in an on-premises Sign Server, accessible only by authorized Moxa personnel.



NOTE

Click the following link for more information on how SecureAPT works: https://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt

Querying the System Image Version

Use the mx-ver command to check the system image version on your Arm-based computers.

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# mx-ver UC-8220-T-LX-US-S MIL3 version 1.0 Build 22052300

Failback Update

We strongly recommend enabling the failback function before performing an update. Refer to <u>failback</u> feature in the Moxa System Manager (MSM) for details.

Managing the APT Repository

The APT Repository is the network server from which APT downloads packages that are installed on your Moxa Arm-based computer. By default, Moxa Arm-based computers include the following repositories that contain stable and well-tested packages best suited for ensuring the stability of your project.

Source list	Repository URL	Description
	https://deb.debian.org/debian	Debian official repository containing the latest
	bullseye	stable Debian 11 release (released about every 2
		months)
/etc/apt/sources.list	https://deb.debian.org/debian	Debian official repository containing bug fixes that
/etc/apt/sources.list	bullseye-updates	will be included in the upcoming Debian 11 release
	https://deb.debian.org/debian -security/bullseye-security	Debian official repository containing security
		hotfixes that will be included in the upcoming
		Debian 11 release
		Moxa repository containing Moxa's proprietary
/etc/apt/sources.list.d/	https://debian.moxa.com/mil3 bullseye	library, tools, utilities, and kernel. Moxa will
moxa.list		maintain security and bug fixes even after Debian
		11 has reached its end of life (EOL).

To add a new repository, you must add the repository URL and official GPG key to the source list and keyring in your Moxa Arm-based computer.

Here is an example for adding the Docker repository <u>https://docs.docker.com/engine/install/debian/</u>.

- 1. Add the repository URL to the source list on your Arm-based computer.
- moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# echo "deb https://download.docker.com/linux/debian bullseye stable" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list
- 2. Add the official GPG public key of the Docker repository to the keyring in your computer for SecureAPT. moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/debian/gpg | gpg --dearmor -o /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/docker.gpg
- 3. Verify the newly added Docker repository by running an update.

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# apt update
Get:1 https://download.docker.com/linux/debian bullseye InRelease [43.3 kB]
Hit:2 http://deb.debian.org/debian bullseye InRelease Get:3
http://deb.debian.org/debian-security bullseye-security InRelease [48.4 kB]
Get:4 https://download.docker.com/linux/debian bullseye/stable amd64
Packages [13.8 kB] Get:5 http://deb.debian.org/debian bullseye-updates
InRelease [44.1 kB] Get:6 http://deb.debian.org/debian-security bullseye-
security/main amd64 Packages [191 kB] Fetched 341 kB in 1s (356 kB/s)
Reading package lists... Done Building dependency tree... Done Reading state
information... Done 30 packages can be upgraded. Run 'apt list --upgradable'
to see them.
```

Updating Your System

Preparing a Staging Environment

Since Moxa Arm-based computers are open platforms, you are free to install any software that you would like to use. However, we highly recommend that you test all new software on a staging platform before installing them on your production gateways.

Synchronizing the Repository Information

The first and most important step is to synchronize the package index files in your Arm-based computer with the source repositories specified in the file /etc/apt/sources.list. When you perform the synchronization, information related to the packages, including versions and dependencies, will also be downloaded from the repositories.

To perform the synchronization, make sure that your network environment can connect to the APT repositories, and then run the **apt update** command with root permission to synchronize the package index.

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:# sudo apt update

Updating the Entire System

Use the **apt full-upgrade** command to upgrade all packages used by your Moxa Arm-based computer to latest versions.

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:# sudo apt full-upgrade

Updating the Bootloader

When a updated Bootloader firmware is available, Moxa will publish a notification on the <u>Moxa Arm-based</u> <u>computer product page</u> and upload the new firmware to the Moxa APT repository. You can download the firmware (**.bin** format) via SecureAPT so that the authenticity and integrity of the firmware is verified.

NOTE

Click the following link for more information on how SecureAPT <u>https://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt</u>

Querying the Current Bootloader Version

Use the **mx-bootloader-mgmt upgrade** -i command to check the current Bootloader version of your Arm-based computer.

```
root@moxa-tbbbb1182827:# mx-bootloader-mgmt upgrade -i
Current bootloader information:
compatible model: UC-8200
bootloader version: 3.0.0S05
sha256sum: 28e2409b9a255e72c5ddd6f8007217be0d49bea21536086f67c2cabb29a9ee05
md5sum: 70199c3b44b37b7e07fecb8df675fd4c
```

Updating Bootloader With the Firmware Binary

Use the mx-bootloader-mgmt upgrade -f [file path] command to update the Bootloader

```
root@moxa-tbbbbl182827:# mx-bootloader-mgmt upgrade -f
/media/USB_p1/bootloader.bin
The version of bootloader being updated: 3.0.0S07
The version of current bootloader: 3.0.0S07
Your bootloader version is the same as the version of bootloader being updated.
Do you want to continue? (y/N)y
Start to upgrade bootloader...
Upgrade /dev/mtd1 bootloader to version 3.0.0S07 successfully
```

Updating with the Failback Function Enabled

We highly recommend you enable failback before performing the bootloader update due to a power outage may cause the device to be unable to boot. Refer to <u>failback</u> feature of Moxa System Manager (MSM) tool.

7. Backup, Decommission, and Recovery

In this chapter, we will introduce how to use Moxa System Management (MSM) utility to perform snapshot, backup, decommission, and recovery of your system. MSM provides an automatic failback mechanism to ensure that the device can recover to the last known working and secure state when the device fails after a critical event such as a system update.

Function	Description		
Snapshot	 The snapshot has a smaller footprint as it saves just the differences (partition 3 in Figure 7.1) compared to the out-of-factory rootfs (partition 2 in Figure 7.1). The snapshot is saved in the Moxa Arm-based computer and cannot be exported. Hence, a snapshot can only be used to restore the computer that the snapshot was taken from. 		
Backup	 The backup has a larger footprint as it saves the entire system including the out-of-factory rootfs. The backup can be exported to an external storage. The backup can be used to restore the Moxa Arm-based computer that the backup is taken from or another computer of the same model. 		
Automatic Failback Recovery	 When failback recovery is enabled, a replica of the system including the snapshot and bootloader is created. If a boot failure event occurs after failback recovery is enabled, the system will automatically use the replica to recover the system Failback recovery should be enabled before performing any critical actions that may potentially result in a device failure (e.g., power loss during a bootloader update could brick a computer). 		

Below diagram illustrate an overview of MIL3 system layout:



Figure 7.1 - Layout Overview of Arm-based Computer with MIL3

Creating a System Snapshot

A snapshot preserves the state and data of the Moxa Arm-based computer as a restoration point at a specific point in time so that you can restore it to that point if something goes wrong. Snapshots only save the Linux kernel and new and modified files to the out-of-factory rootfs (partition 2). Therefore, the size of a snapshot is much smaller than a backup.

Use the **#** mx-system-mgmt snapshot <sub-command> <flag> to create restore a system. You must use sudo or run the command with root permission.

Sub-commands	Description
create	 Creates a snapshot of system A snapshot includes kernel (partition 1) and rootfs (partition 3) Only one snapshot is saved. A new snapshot will overwrite the previous snapshot Snapshot is stored in rootfs (partition 3)
restore	Restores the system with the snapshot. <u>System failback</u> will be disabled after a system is restored from the snapshot.
delete	Deletes the existing snapshot
Info	Displays the create time and size of the existing snapshot

Flag	Description
-y oryes	Automatically consent to the prompts during create, restore, and delete processes

Creating a System Backup

Compares to snapshot, a backup saves Linux kernel and the rootfs on your Moxa Arm-based Computer. Therefore, a backup can be exported and use to restore a Moxa Arm-based computer of the same model with MIL 3.0. For example, if you create a backup on UC-8200 Secure model with MIL3, you can use the backup to restore another UC-8200 Secure model with MIL3

Use **#** mx-system-mgmt backup <sub-command> <flag> command to create, delete, and restore a backup. You must use sudo or run the command with the root permission.

Sub-commands	Description		
create	 Creates a backup of the system The backup includes kernel (partition 1), rootfs (partition 2), and rootfs (partition 3) By default, the backup is created in the /boot_device/p3/backup/ directory with the name backup.tar, together with an info file that contains the backup information and cryptographic hash of the backup. The backup includes system snapshot. If you would like to reduce the size of backup, you can delete the snapshot in the system before performing the backup if the snapshot is not needed. 		
delete	Deletes the backup from default directory		
restore	 Restores the system using the backup from default directory. <u>System failback</u> will be disabled after restoration. Existing <u>snapshot</u> on system will be deleted after restoring the system from a backup. The cryptographic hash in the info file will be used to validate the integrity of the backup file before the restore process begin. A system reboot is required after restoration. 		
info	Displays the create time and size of the backup in the default directory		
-D ordirectory	Specifies the directory for create, delete, restore and info commands		

Flag	Description
-y oryes	Automatically consent to the prompt during create, delete and restore

The following example shows how to back up a system to a USB storage drive with the mounting point

/media/USB_p1:

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo mx-system-mgmt backup create -D /media/USB_p1
Set /media/USB_p1 as backup directory.
Check the backup information...
There is no backup information

```
Start evaluating space, please wait...
Estimation of Required Space: 628MB
Available Space: 32756MB
Would you like to continue? (y/N)y
Synchronize boot files...
0 0% 0.00kB/s 0:00:00 (xfr#0, to-chk=0/2)
Start creating backup file...
628MiB 0:00:57 [11.0MiB/s] [ <=> ]
Type: backup
Create Time: 2021.11.06-17:32:29
Size: 628MB
The backup has been created successfully under: /media/USB p1
```

The following example shows how to restore a backup from the USB storage drive with the mounting point

/media/USB_p1:

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo mx-system-mgmt backup restore -D /media/USB_p1
Set /media/USB_p1 as backup directory.
Check the backup information...
Type: backup
Create Time: 2021.11.06-17:44:43
Size: 628MB
Start verifying backup file, please wait...
Verified OK!
Start evaluating space, please wait...
Estimation of Required Space: 628MB
Available Space: 5125MB
Would you like to continue? (y/N)y
Check the snapshot information...
Type: snapshot
Create Time: 2021.11.06-15:42:47
Size: 235MB
This will delete the existing snapshot.
Do you want to continue? (y/N)y
Check the snapshot information...
Type: snapshot
Create Time: 2021.11.06-15:42:47
Size: 235MB
The snapshot has been deleted successfully.
To restore the backup file will overwrite current system and factory default
system.
Do you want to continue? (y/N)y
Start using the backup file to restore the system...
100%
Synchronize boot files...
             0 0%
                     0.00kB/s
                                 0:00:00 (xfr#0, to-chk=0/2)
System has been restored successfully. Reboot is required to take effect.
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo reboot
```

Setting the System to the Default

Press and hold the **FN** button for 7 to 9 seconds to reset the computer to the factory default settings. When the reset button is held down, the LED will blink once every second. The LED will become steady when you hold the button continuously for 7 to 9 seconds. Release the button immediately when the LED become steady to load the factory default settings. For additional details on the LEDs, refer to the quick installation guide or the user's manual for your Arm-based computer



ATTENTION

Reset-to-default will erase all data stored on the boot-up storage

Back up your files before resetting the system to factory defaults. All the data stored in the Arm-based computer's boot-up storage will be destroyed after resetting to factory defaults.

You can also use the **mx-system-mgmt default restore** command to restore the computer to factory default settings. You must use sudo or run the command with the root permission.

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:/# sudo mx-system-mgmt default restore

If you would like to configure the **FN** button for a different action (e.g., restore to a snapshot), refer to <u>Customize the Button Action</u> section.

Decommissioning the System

Compared with the set-to-default function, decommissioning will further erase all data stored in the log partition to help erase security-sensitive information.

ATTENTION

Decommission will erase all the data including event and audit logs

Please back up your files before resetting the system to factory defaults. All user data including logs in your Arm-based computer will be destroyed after performing decommissioning. Bootloader configuration, including administrator password, will also be set to factory default.

You can also use the **mx-system-mgmt default decommission** command to restore the computer to factory default. You must use sudo or run the command with the root permission.

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:/# sudo mx-system-mgmt default decommission

The decommissioning process will do the following:

- 1. Overwrite the system partition 4 times with shred so that all user files will be deleted and cannot be recovered.
- Overwrite the log partition 4 times with shred so that all log files will be deleted and cannot be recovered.
- 3. Trigger the bootloader decommissioning function, so all configurations and log messages in the bootloader are also deleted and cannot be recovered.

System Failback Recovery

A system bootup failure may occur when critical files are lost or corrupted. A typical and common cause of boot up failure is power lost during system update. Moxa System Management (MSM) provides system failback capability which can automatically recovers your system to the last known working state if boot up failure is detected after critical change(s) are made to the primary system. The boot failure criteria are customizable by user.

Before applying critical update or changes to the device, it is recommended to enable system failback first.



Use **#** mx-system-mgmt system-failback <sub-command> <flag> to enable or disable system failback. You must use sudo or run the command with the root permission.

Sub-commands	Description	
enable	 Enables system failback and create a replica of the system The replica includes Bootloader, kernel (partition 1) and rootfs (partition 3) The replica is stored in rootfs (partition 3) When the Moxa Arm-based computer fails to boot up, the device will automatically reboot and replace the broken system with the working replica. The replica includes a system snapshot. If you would like to reduce the size of the replica, you can delete the snapshot if you no longer need it. 	
disable	Disables the system failback and delete the existing system replica	
info	Displays the create time and size of replica	
state	Displays the status of system failback (enabled/disabled)	

Flag	Description
-y oryes	Automatically consent to the prompts during the enable and disable processes

Below is an example of how to enable system failback and display the information of the system replica:

```
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:/# sudo mx-system-mgmt system-failback enable
Start evaluating space, please wait...
Estimation of Required Space: 233MB
Available Space: 5333MB
Would you like to continue? (y/N) y
Start processing...
Synchronize boot files ...
                  0%
                        0.00kB/s
                                    0:00:00 (xfr#0, to-chk=0/2)
                  0%
                        0.00kB/s
                                    0:00:00 (xfr#0, to-chk=0/2)
Start creating replica...
                      11.94MB/s
   244,670,045 99%
                                  0:00:19 (xfr#170, to-chk=0/294)
Type: replica
Create Time: 2021.11.06-14:35:14
Size: 235MB
The system failback has been enabled and the replica has been created
successfully.
moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:/# sudo mx-system-mgmt system-failback info
Check the replica information...
Type: replica
Create Time: 2021.11.06-14:35:14
Size: 235MB
```

Customize the Boot Up Failure Criteria

If you would like to customize the boot failure criteria, you can edit below script to add criteria you like Moxa System Manager to check.

/etc/moxa-system-manager/check-hooks.d/99-example.sh

In below example in **99-example.sh**, Moxa System Manager will consider the boot up is successful if "moxa-connection-manager.service" start successfully by returning a zero value. If the program returns a non-zero value, the moxa-system-manager service will not mark this startup as successful, and it will enter the system-failback process to restore the system.

#systemctl is-active moxa-connection-manager.service && exit 0 || exit 1

In this chapter, we will introduce Moxa Arm-based computers key security functions and a security hardening guide to deploy and operate Moxa computer in a secure manner

Communication Integrity and Authentication

Below is a list of network communication services and protocols available in the Moxa Arm-based computer and their data integrity and authentication protection mechanisms.

Service	Protocol	Data Integrity	Data Authentication
SSH server and client SSH		HMAC algorithm is used to	Uses key signature algorithms
SFTP server	SSH	quarantee data integrity	such as ED25519 or ECDSA to
SCP server	SSH		verify authenticity
	HTTPS	<u>SecureAPT</u> uses checksum to guarantee data integrity	SecureAPT uses GPG public key
APT client			system to validate data
			authenticity
	pport) TLS/SSL, NTP	NTS guarantees data integrity	NTS provides TLS layer to
NTP client (NTS support)		via NTS Authenticator and	quarantee authenticity
		Encrypted EF	



ATTENTION

For post-installed communication services and protocols, you must ensure data integrity and authentication are implemented. If integrity and authentication are not available, you must use additional compensating countermeasures in system to compensate the risk. For example, physical cable protection for serial Modbus RTU.

User Account Permissions and Privileges

Switching to the Root Privilege

In Moxa Arm-based computers, the root account is disabled in favor of better security. The default user account **moxa** belongs to the sudo group. Sudo is a program designed to let system administrators allow permitted users to execute some commands as the root user or another user. The basic philosophy is to give as few privileges as possible but still allow people to get their work done. Using sudo is better (safer) than opening a session as root for a number of reasons, including:

- Nobody needs to know the root password (sudo prompts for the current user's password). Extra
 privileges can be granted to individual users temporarily, and then taken away without the need for a
 password change.
- It is easy to run only the commands that require special privileges via sudo; the rest of the time, you work as an unprivileged user, which reduces the damage caused by mistakes.
- Some system-level commands are not available to the user moxa directly, as shown in the sample output below:

m	noxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ sudo ifconfig
е	eth0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:90:e8:00:00:07
	inet addr:192.168.3.127 Bcast:192.168.3.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
	UP BROADCAST ALLMULTI MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
	RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
	TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
	collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000



You can switch to the root account using the **sudo** -i (or **sudo** su) command. For security reasons, do not operate the **all** commands from the root account.



NOTE

Click the following link for more information on the **sudo** command. <u>https://wiki.debian.org/sudo</u>



ATTENTION

You might get the permission denied message when using pipe or redirect behavior with a non-root account.

You must use 'sudo su -c' to run the command instead of using >, <, >>, <<, etc.

Note: The single quotes enclosing the full command are required.

Controlling Permissions and Privileges

Moxa Industrial Linux uses Discretionary Access Control (DAC) based on Access Control Lists (ACLs) to manage permissions and privileges, which an object has an owner that controls the permissions to access the object. Subjects can transfer their access to other subjects. In other words, the owner of the resource has full access and can determine the access type (rwx: read, write, execute) of other users.

You can use **chmod** command to configure who (user, group, other) can do what (read, write, execute) to a file or directory. The access permission is extended by Access Control Lists (ACLs) authorization. ACL provides a more flexible mechanism that allows multiple users and groups to own an object. You can check and configure access control lists of a specific file or directory using **getfacl** and **setfacl** commands.



NOTE

Click the following link for more information on usages of chmod and Access Control Lists (ACLs) <u>https://wiki.debian.org/Permissions</u>

Moxa Arm-based computers only provide one account in sudo group by default because it is intended for the system integrator to customize and build their applications on top.

The system integrator shall be responsible for setting the appropriate permissions to roles and user accounts to enforce the concept of least privilege.

Linux Login Policy

Invalid Login Attempts

Moxa Industrial Linux provides the capability to configure allowed invalid login attempts to mitigate against Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Brute-force attack.

Security Model	Default Rule
Secure model	[5] consecutive invalid login within [60] seconds will deny access for [300]
	seconds.
Standard model	Not set

Following is the configuration file and variable to configure the setting:

Configuration Option	Configuration file	Variable to Set
Consecutive invalid login	/etc/security/faillock.conf	deny
Within how many seconds	/etc/security/faillock.conf	fail_interval
Deny access for how long (in seconds)	/etc/security/faillock.conf	unlock_time

More configurable options can be found in following reference:

- login.defs(5) login Debian bullseye Debian Manpages
- <u>faillock.conf(5)</u> libpam-modules Debian bullseye Debian Manpages

Session Termination After Inactivity

This setting automatically terminates the login sessions after a standard period of inactivity. Below is the default configuration set in Moxa Arm-based computer.

Security Model	Default Value
Secure model	 Automatically logout standard user after 900 second of inactivity Automatically terminate root privilege of sudo user after 900 second of inactivity
Standard model	Not set

Follow below instructions to configure the inactivity time:

Login Method	Configuration
Serial Console and SSH (Secure Shell)	 Set the value (in seconds) of variable TMOUT in /etc/profile.d/99-moxa-profile.conf Apply the same value to variable ClientAliveInterval in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-moxa-sshd.conf To apply the rule to sudo user, make sure variable env_keep+="TMOUT" exist in /etc/sudoers.d/00-moxa-sudoers-conf

Login Banner Message

You can set a message banner message to displaying welcome or informational messages or warming message to un-authorized users. Follow below instructions to add a banner Moxa Industrial Linux 3.0 UM for Arm-based Computers Moxa Industrial Linux 3.0 UM for Arm-based Computers.

Login Method	Banner Content	Additional Configuration Required	
Serial Console	/etc/issue	n/a	
SSH (Secure Shell)	l/otc/iccuo pot	Add variable Banner /etc/issue.net is added in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-moxa-sshd.conf	

Bootloader Login Policy

For bootloader login policy management, refers to the **bootloader configuration** section.

Secure Boot and Disk Encryption

Secure boot and disk encryption are available in Secure model, designed to make platform integration more secure. Moxa's secure boot process begins from CPU as hardware root-of-trust to ensure integrity and authenticity of bootloaders and Linux kernels are validated with Moxa digital signature before execution, preventing malicious or un-authenticated bootloader and kernels to run on Moxa Arm-based computer.

Next, only after bootloader and kernel have been validated, the LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup) encrypted root file system (rtfs) will be decrypted by a key provisioned in TPM during factory production. The disk encryption prevent confidential data could be read without authorization when the device is stolen or lost.



Public key infrastructure (PKI)

Moxa secure boot use X.509 public key infrastructure (PKI) to validate authenticity and integrity of bootloader and Linux kernel.

How are private keys protected?

Private keys used to digital sign Moxa software are stored in on-premises tamper and intrusion-resistant hardware security module (HSM), where strict access authorization and 24-hour video surveillance are applied.

Key lifecycle and revocation

In an unlikely scenario where the private key stored in HSM is compromised, Moxa will announce the news on <u>Moxa Security Advisory</u>, including instructions to revoke the compromised public key burned in the CPU via a utility downloadable from Moxa APT repository. Then update the bootloader and system image signed by a new private key.



ATTENTION

DO NOT arbitrarily replace the kernel or bootloader on Secure models, or the computer will not be able to boot up.

Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0)

The Moxa Arm-based computer includes a TPM 2.0 hardware module. TPM provides a hardware-based approach to manage user authentication, network access, data protection and more that takes security to higher level than software-based security. It is strongly recommended to manage keys with TPM and also store digital credentials such as passwords

The TPM can be managed via the tpm2_tools pre-installed in Moxa Industrial Linux (<u>https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools</u>).

TPM software stack & tool is maintained by tpm2-software community https://tpm2-software.github.io/

A good reference of TPM 2.0 introduction https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4302-6584-9_3

Host Intrusion Detection

Secure model of Moxa Arm-based computer comes with **AIDE** (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) preconfigured. AIDE is a lightweight but powerful host intrusion detection utility for checking the integrity of files.

The out-of-factory Moxa Arm-based computer comes with a database created by AIDE at the first time bootup containing all security configurations set by Moxa. You can compare the system's status against this database to find out if there is any integrity breach. You can also update the database after making changes to the configuration or adding additional software.

Default Monitored Files

Below are the security configuration files and directories included in the default database created by Moxa.

- The database is aide-moxa.db and put under /var/lib/aide/aide-moxa.db
- The configuration file of AIDE is /etc/aide/aide-moxa.conf; you can add additional files and directories to the database

Configuration Type	Path			
	/etc/adduser.conf			
	/etc/login.defs			
File	/etc/logrotate.conf			
	/etc/nftables.conf			
	/etc/profile			
	/etc/rsyslog.conf			
	/etc/sudoers			
	/etc/aide			
	/etc/audit			
	/etc/logrotate.d			
	/etc/moxa/MoxaComputerInterfaceManager			
	/etc/moxa/MoxaConnectionManager			
	/etc/moxa/moxa-guardian			
Directory	/etc/pam.d			
	/etc/security			
	/etc/profile.d			
	/etc/rsyslog.d			
	/etc/ssh			
	/etc/sudoers.d			
	/var/lib/moxa-guardian			

To run a comparison between current system against the Moxa AIDE database, run **aide** --check -c /etc/aide/aide-moxa.conf

To update the database after you have make configuration changes, run **aide** --init -c /etc/aide/aide-moxa.conf

You should see following output which created a new AIDE database **aide-moxa.db.new** under **/var/lib/aide**



For AIDE to use the new database, you need to rename it to aide-moxa.db

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo mv /var/lib/aide/aide-moxa.db.new
/var/lib/aide/aide-moxa.db

At this point, you can run **aide** --check -c /etc/aide/aide-moxa.conf to compare current system against the updated AIDE database

How to Perform Authenticity an Integrity Check on All Files

If you would like to ensure authenticity and integrity of all files in the Moxa Arm-based computer, you can create a openSSL signed database containing every single file under the filesystems, then validate the authenticity of the database before using AIDE to check the integrity of all files in the filesystem. Following below steps to create such AIDE database.

 Create a database using /etc/aide/aide-fs.conf; this configuration file monitors every single file in the filesystem.

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo aide --init -c /etc/aide/aide-fs.conf

- 2. Rename the created database to /var/lib/aide/aide-fs-moxa.db
- 3. Generate a 4096-bit RSA private key.

```
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo openssl genrsa -out aide-key.pem 4096
Generating RSA private key, 4096 bit long modulus (2 primes)
.....++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
Enter pass phrase for aide-key.pem:
```



ATTENTION

You MUST keep the private key and pass phrase in a secure location.

4. Generate a public key from the private key:

```
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~$ sudo openssl rsa -in aide-key.pem -pubout -out
aide-
key.pub
Enter pass phrase for aide-key.pem:
writing RSA key
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~$
```

5. Generate a digital signature of **aide-filesystem-moxa.db** by the private key.

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~\$ sudo openssl dgst -sha256 -sign aide-key.pem -out aide-filesystem-moxa.db.sha256 /var/lib/aide/aide-fs-moxa.db Enter pass phrase for aide-key.pem:

- 6. Now, you can distribute the database, public key and signed signature to other location, such as a centralized remote system.
- 7. Verify the database has been tampered or not. moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~\$ sudo openssl dgst -sha256 -verify aide-key.pub signature aide-filesystem-moxa.db.sha256 /var/lib/aide/aide-fs-moxa.db Verified OK
- 8. After the AIDE database' authenticity has been validated, you can run a comparison between current system against the AIDE database using **aide** --check -c /etc/aide/aide-fs.conf



NOTE

Click the following link for more information on usages of AIDE https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/aide-dynamic/aide.1.en.html

Intrusion Prevention

Fail2ban is pre-installed in Moxa Industrial Linux as an intrusion prevention software framework designed to prevent against brute-force attacks



NOTE

Click the following link for detail instructions of Fail2ban usage https://www.fail2ban.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page

Network Security Monitoring

Zeek is pre-installed in Moxa Industrial Linux for network security monitoring. Zeek is a passive network traffic analyzer. Many operators use Zeek as a network security monitor (NSM) to support investigations of suspicious or malicious activity. Zeek also supports a wide range of traffic analysis tasks beyond the security domain, including performance measurement and troubleshooting. Zeek provides an extensive set of logs describing network activity. These logs include not only a comprehensive record of every connection seen on the wire, but also application-layer transcripts

If you have configured **cellular(4G/LTE)** and **ethernet** networks in <u>Moxa Connection Manager (MCM)</u>. You can also enable Zeek to monitor the network traffic of these interfaces. Following the simple instruction below:

1. Export the Zeek environment.

export PATH=\$PATH:/opt/zeek/bin export ZEEK_PREFIX=/opt/zeek

2. [Required] Configure the interface to monitor by running **#** vim \$ZEEK_PREFIX/etc/node.cfg.

3. [Required] Modify the interface list according to the interface you like to monitor. For example, add LAN1, LAN2, and cellular (4G/LTE) in the list.

```
# This example has a standalone node ready to go except for possibly
changing
# the sniffing interface.
# This is a complete standalone configuration. Most likely you will
# only need to change the interface.
[zeek]
type=standalone
host=localhost
interface=eth0,eth1,wwan0
```

 [Optional] change the MailTo email address to a desired recipient and the LogRotationInterval to a desired log archival frequency

vim \$ZEEK PREFIX/etc/zeekctl.cfg

Recipient address for all emails sent out by Zeek and ZeekControl. MailTo = root@localhost

```
# Rotation interval in seconds for log files on manager (or standalone)
node.
# A value of 0 disables log rotation.
LogRotationInterval = 3600
```

5. [Required] Run **\$ZEEK_PREFIX/bin/zeekctl** to start **Zeek**

```
root@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/home/moxa# $ZEEK PREFIX/bin/zeekctl
```

```
Hint: Run the zeekctl "deploy" command to get started. Welcome to ZeekControl 2.4.0
```

Type "help" for help. [ZeekControl] >

6. [Required] For the first-time use of the shell, use **install** command to perform initial installation of the ZeekControl configuration.

```
[ZeekControl] > install
creating policy directories ...
installing site policies ...
generating standalone-layout.zeek ...
generating local-networks.zeek ...
generating zeekctl-config.zeek ...
generating zeekctl-config.sh ...
[ZeekControl] >
```

7. [Required] Start Zeek instance by **Start** command (Use CTRL+D to exit if initializing successfully).

```
[ZeekControl] > start
starting zeek ...
```

(zeek still initializing)

8. View the Zeek logs under **\$ZEEK_PREFIX/logs**.

```
root@moxa-tbbbb1182816:/# 1s -alh /opt/zeek/logs/current/
total 96K
drwxr-sr-x 2 root zeek 4.0K Jun 19 04:18 .
drwxrws--- 1 root zeek 4.0K Jun 19 04:17 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root zeek 250 Jun 19 04:18 capture_loss.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root zeek 128 Jun 19 04:17 .cmdline
-rw-r--r-- 1 root zeek 583 Jun 19 04:18 conn.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root zeek 352 Jun 19 04:17 .env_vars
-rw-r--r-- 1 root zeek 30K Jun 19 04:17 loaded_scripts.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root zeek 753 Jun 19 04:18 notice.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root zeek 227 Jun 19 04:17 packet_filter.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root zeek 5 Jun 19 04:17 .pid
```

-rw-rr 1	root	zeek	61	Jun	19	04:17	.startup
-rw-rr 1	root	zeek	686	Jun	19	04:17	stats.log
-rwxr-xr-x 1	root	zeek	19	Jun	19	04:17	.status
-rw-rr 1	root	zeek	19	Jun	19	04:17	stderr.log
-rw-rr 1	root	zeek	204	Jun	19	04:17	stdout.log
-rw-rr 1	root	zeek	367	Jun	19	04:18	weird.log

NOTE

Click the following link for Zeek's detail instruction and also the explanation on log types <u>https://docs.zeek.org/en/master/quickstart.html</u>

If you prefer not to use ZeekControl (e.g., you don't need its automation and management features), you can refer to https://docs.zeek.org/en/master/quickstart.html#zeek-as-a-command-line-utility on how to directly control Zeek for your analysis activities from the command line for both live traffic and offline working from traces.

Firewall

nftable is the built-in firewall in Moxa Industrial Linux. Secure model of Moxa Arm-based computer has preconfigured rules to further protect your device from network attacks.



NOTE

Click the following link for detail instructions of nftable usages <u>https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Main_Page</u> <u>https://wiki.nftables.org/wiki-nftables/index.php/Quick_reference-nftables_in_10_minutes</u>

Pre-configured Rule

Below is a summary of nftable rules in **/etc/nftables.conf** set by Moxa in Secure model of Moxa Armbased computer. For Standard model, nftable is not enabled by default.

Rules Set	Location/Parameters
Allowed only ports following port • TCP: SSH (22), HTTPS (443) • UDP: NTP (123), DNS (53)	define tcp_port_allow = { ssh, https }; define udp_port_allow = { 53, ntp };
Allow all traffic from loopback interface	iifname "lo" accept
Drop all input traffic except for traffic from allowed ports and icmp (ping)	chain input {}
Allow related and established traffic by using	ct state invalid drop
conntrack	ct state established, related accept
Drop all forward traffic	chain forward {}
Accept all output traffic	chain output {}

```
flush ruleset
```

```
define tcp_port_allow = { 22, 443 };
define udp_port_allow = { 53, 123 };
table inet filter {
    # input: drop all traffic
    chain input {
        type filter hook input priority 0; policy drop;
        ct state invalid drop
        ct state established,related accept
        # allow icmp
```

```
icmp type {
                echo-request,
                echo-reply,
                time-exceeded,
                parameter-problem,
                destination-unreachable
        } accept
        # allow icmp6
        icmpv6 type {
                echo-request,
                echo-reply,
                time-exceeded,
                parameter-problem,
                destination-unreachable,
                nd-neighbor-solicit,
                nd-router-advert,
                nd-neighbor-advert
        } accept
        # accept lo
        iifname "lo" accept
        tcp dport $tcp_port_allow accept
        udp dport $udp port allow accept
# foward: drop all traffic
chain forward {
        type filter hook forward priority 0; policy drop;
# output: accept all traffic
chain output {
        type filter hook output priority 0; policy accept;
```

Common nftable Usage

- 1. List the currently loaded nftable rules # nft list ruleset
- 2. Debug and tracing if traffic are drop or accept as expected **# nft monitor trace**
 - a. Add trace_chain before the existing input chain
 - nft add chain inet filter trace_chain { type filter hook prerouting
 priority -1\; }
 - b. Add nftrace flag
 - nft add rule inet filter trace_chain meta nftrace set 1
 - c. Monitor trace (you can use another device with neat tool to test it)dd nftrace flag

```
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182816:/# sudo nft monitor trace
trace id d51bdall inet filter trace_chain packet: iif "eth0" ether saddr
d8:5e:d3:a5:7b:29 ether daddr 00:90:e8:a6:37:cb ip saddr 192.168.1.102 ip
daddr 192.168.1.107 ip dscp cs0 ip ecn not-ect ip ttl 128 ip id 36481 ip
protocol tcp ip length 52 tcp sport 1142 tcp dport 53 tcp flags == syn
tcp window 64240 trace id d51bdall inet filter trace_chain rule meta
nftrace set 1 (verdict continue) trace id d51bdall inet filter
trace_chain verdict continue trace id d51bdall inet filter trace_chain
policy accept trace id d51bdall inet filter input packet: iif "eth0"
ether saddr d8:5e:d3:a5:7b:29 ether daddr 00:90:e8:a6:37:cb ip saddr
192.168.1.102 ip daddr 192.168.1.107 ip dscp cs0 ip ecn not-ect ip ttl
```
128 ip id 36481 ip protocol tcp ip length 52 tcp sport 1142 tcp dport 53	3
tcp flags == syn tcp window 64240 trace id d51bda11 inet filter input	
verdict continue trace id d51bda11 inet filter input policy drop	

- d. Once debugging is completed, make sure to remove the debug flag by either method below:
 - Restart nftable # systemctl restart nftables or
 - □ Reload the configuration again # nft -f /etc/nftables.conf

Rate Limiting

Rate limiting is a common strategy to prevent network attacks such as DOS, DDOS, and brute force by limiting the network traffic within a specified time. As the suitable rate limit configuration depends heavily on the asset owner's applications, rate limiting is not configured by default in Moxa Industrial Linux.

nftable Rate Limit Usage	Example of Rate Limit Configuration
	limit rate 400/minute
	limit rate 400/hour
	limit rate over 40/day
	limit rate over 400/week
	limit rate over 1023/second burst 10 packets
rate [over] <value> <unit> [burst <value></value></unit></value>	limit rate 1025 kbytes/second
<unit>]</unit>	limit rate 1023000 mbytes/second
	limit rate 1025 bytes/second burst 512 bytes
	limit rate 1025 kbytes/second burst 1023 kbytes
	limit rate 1025 mbytes/second burst 1025 kbytes
	limit rate 1025000 mbytes/second burst 1023 mbytes

You can directly add rate limit to existing rule in /etc/nftables.conf:

Below is an example of limiting TCP and UDP network traffic to 4 packets per second

```
#!/usr/sbin/nft -f
flush ruleset
define tcp port allow = { ssh, https };
define udp port allow = { 53, ntp };
table inet filter {
        # input: drop all traffic
        chain input {
                type filter hook input priority 0; policy drop;
                ct state invalid drop
                ct state established, related accept
                # allow icmp
                ip protocol icmp icmp type {
                        echo-request,
                        echo-reply,
                        time-exceeded,
                        parameter-problem,
                        destination-unreachable
                } accept
                # allow icmp6
                ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type {
                        echo-request,
                        echo-reply,
                        time-exceeded,
                        parameter-problem,
                        destination-unreachable
                } accept
```



Mitigating a NTP Amplification Attack

The default configured NTP servers in Moxa Industrial Linux(MIL) are with NTS support. If you use public NTP servers without NTS support, it is vulnerable to the **NTP amplification attack**, in which the attacker could exploit the public NTP servers to overwhelm Moxa Arm-based computer with UDP traffic. Under such an incident, you can follow the steps to stop the attack:

- 1. Stop NTP service temporarily with the # systemctl stop systemd-timesyncd command.
- 2. Block the tainted NTP server by nftables command
 - a. Create new firewall table

nft add table inet firewall-filter

b. Create new chain input in firewall table

nft add chain inet firewall-filter input

c. Create new chain input in firewall table

nft add rule inet firewall-filter input tcp dport { ntp } ip saddr <your ip> reject

d. Block NTP server IP

nft add rule inet firewall-filter input tcp dport { ntp } ip saddr <your ip> reject

e. Check the rule set



- 3. You can choose to specify another NTP server (modify /etc/systemd/timesyncd.conf) or wait for this server to finish troubleshooting
- 4. Remember to flush the rule after recovery

```
nft delete chain inet firewall-filter input # delete chain
# or
nft delete table inet firewall-filter # delete table
```

Service and Ports

Only activate protocols that you require to use the system. Below is the list for the protocol and port numbers used for all external interfaces. Please refer to <u>Firewall</u> section to modify the list of allowed port if additional port is required.

Protocol	Port Number
SSH	22
HTTPS	443
NTS	123/4460
DNS	53

Disable Unnecessary Protocols, Services, and Ports

You can use **#ss** to list all the current running processes using with the associated service, protocol, and network port.

moxa@moxa	-tbbbb118282	7:~\$ sudo ss	-tulpn	
Netid	State	Recv-Q	Send-Q	Local Address:Port
Peer Addr	ess:Port	Process		
tcp	LISTEN	0	128	0.0.0:22
0.0.0.0:*	u	sers:(("sshd"	,pid=974,fd=3))	
tcp	LISTEN	0	128	[::]:22
[::]:*	user	s:(("sshd",pi	d=974,fd=4))	

You can disable a daemon or service by killing process ID (PID) directly. For example:

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~\$ sudo kill 974

Or you can just stop and disable the service using **#systemct1**. For example:

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~\$ sudo systemctl stop sshd moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:~\$ sudo systemctl disable sshd

Restrict Unnecessary Protocols, Services, and Ports

1. Protocols:

Use **nfables** meta to match kind of TCP traffic Matching packet metainformation. Refers to <u>nftables</u> <u>wiki</u>.

2. Services:

Use **#** systemctl list-unit-files to find unused services and disable them by systemctl disable <service>.

3. Ports:

Use nftables to add accepted ports in whitelist. Refers to the <u>Firewall</u> section for detail instructions.

Services Enabled by Default

Below is the list for the services enabled by default in the secure model of the Moxa Arm-based computers.

Service Name	Description			
auditd.service	Security Audit log service			
dbus.service	System Message Bus			
fail2ban.service	Fail2ban IPS (intrusion prevention software)			
getty@tty1.service	Getty on tty1			
ifupdown-pre.service	Helper to synchronize boot up for ifupdown			
kmod-static-nodes.service	Create list of static device nodes for the current kernel			
ModemManager.service	DBus-activated daemon which controls mobile broadband			
inoderninariager.service	(2G/3G/4G) devices and connections			
moxa-connection-manager.service	Moxa Connection Manager (MCM)			
moxa-guardian.service	Initializing security configuration for Moxa Industrial Linux			
moxa-system-manager-init.service	Moxa System Manager initialization service			
moxa-system-manager.service	Moxa System Manager			
MoxaComputerInterfaceManager.service	Moxa Computer Interface Manager			
networking.service	Raises or downs the network interfaces			
NetworkManager.service	Network Manager			
nftables.service	nftable			
polkit.service	For controlling system-wide privileges is Moxa Industrial Linux			
rsyslog.service	System Logging Service			
serial-getty@ttymxc0.service	Serial Getty on ttymxc0al-getty@ttymxc0.service			
ssh.service	SSH Server			
systemd-journal-flush.service	Flush journal to persistent storage			
systemd-journald.service	Journal service			
systemd-logind.service	User login management			
systemd-modules-load.service	Early boot service that loads kernel modules			
systemd-random-seed.service	Service that loads an on-disk random seed into the kernel entropy pool during boot and saves it at shutdown			

Service Name	Description
systemd-remount-fs.service	early boot service that applies mount options listed in fstab(5)
systemd-sysctl.service	An early boot service that configures sysctl(8) kernel
systemu-systemice	parameters
systemd-sysusers.service	Creates system users and groups, based on the file format and
systemu-sysusers.service	location specified in sysusers.d(5)
systemd-timesyncd.service	System service that synchronizes the local system clock with a
systemu-timesyncu.service	remote Network Time Protocol (NTP) server
systemd-tmpfiles-setup-dev.service	Create Static Device Nodes in /dev
systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service	Create Volatile Files and Directories
systemd-udev-trigger.service	Coldplug all udev devicesd-udev-trigger.service
systemd-udevd.service	Listens to kernel uevents
ystemd-update-utmp.service	Service that writes SysV runlevel changes to utmp and wtmp, as
systemu-update-utimp.service	well as the audit logs
systemd-user-sessions.service	a service that controls user logins through pam_nologin(8)
user-runtime-dir@1000.service	Default user
user@1000.service	Default user
vnstat.service	network traffic monitor
watchdog.service	Watchdog service
wpa_supplicant.service	WPA supplicant

Managing Resources

Setting The Process Priority

A process can be manually adjusted to increase or decrease its priority. Use the **top** or **ps** commands to find out the process priority.

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo top									
top - 22:08	8:43 up 6 mi	n, 1 us	er, lo	ad ave	era	age: (0.01,	0.04, 0.02	1
Tasks: 105	total, 1	running,	104 sl	eeping	1,	0 :	stoppe	ed, 0 zor	nbie
%Cpu(s): (0.2 us, 0.8	sy, 0.	0 ni, 9	98.8 ic	ł,	0.1	wa,	0.0 hi, (0.0 si, 0.0 st
KiB Mem :	2068192 tot	al, 187	4520 fr	cee,		57416	used,	136256	buff/cache
KiB Swap:	0 tot	al,	0 fr	ee,		0	used.	1799712	avail Mem
		- ,		,					
PID USER	PR NI	VIRT	RES	SHR	S	%CPU	%MEM	TIME+	COMMAND
1 root		9492	6220	5236	S	0.0	0.3	0:00.98	systemd
2 root	20 0	0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0		kthreadd
3 root		0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.01	ksoftirgd/0
4 root		0	0	0	S		0.0		kworker/0:0
5 root		0	0		S		0.0		kworker/0:0H
6 root		0	0		S		0.0		kworker/u2:0
7 root		0	0		ວ ເວ	0.0	0.0		rcu sched
/ 1001		0	0	0	S	0.0	0.0	0.00.02	

You can also use the ps command with the -1, long list option to find out the priority of the process.

moxa@moxa-tbbb	b1182	827:/#	sı	ido r	os -e	efl					
F S UID	PID	PPID	С	-			DR SZ	WCHAN	STIME	TTY	TIME CMD
4 S root	1	0	0				2373	ep_pol	22:02	?	00:00:01
/sbin/init											
1 S root	2	0	0				0	kthrea	22 : 02	?	00:00:00
[kthrreadd]											
1 S root	3	2	0				0	smpboo	22 : 02	?	00:00:00
[ksoftirqd/0]											
1 S root	5	2	0		-20		0	worker	22 : 02	?	00:00:00
[kworker/0:0H]											
1 S root	6	2	0				0	worker	22 : 02	?	00:00:00
[kworker/u2:0]											
1 S root	7	2	0				0	rcu_gp	22:02	?	00:00:00
[rcu_sched]											

1 S root 8 2 0 80 0 - 0 rcu_gp 22:02 ? 00:00:00 [rcu_bh]

The PRI (Priority) or NI (Nice) is the priority of the process. The PRI is adjusted by kernel automatically. The NI can have a value in the range -20 to 19. A smaller value means that the program could use more CPU resources.

The nice utility can be given a specific nice value while running a program. This example shows how to launch the **tar** utility with the nice value 5.



You can use the **renice** utility to dynamically adjust the nice value of a program. This example uses renice to adjust the auditd, PID 639, with highest priority as -20.

```
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo renice -n 20 -p 639
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo ps -efl|grep auditd
1 S root 639 1 0 75 -20 - 1519 poll_s 22:02 ? 00:00:00
/sbin/auditd -n
```

ΝΟΤΕ

Click the following link for more information on usages of nice and renice https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/coreutils/nice.1.en.html https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/coreutils/nice.1.en.html

Setting the Process I/O Scheduling Class and Priority

The **ionice** command can adjust the priority of the program using I/O. The class and priority are adjustable for a process.

	0: none
	1: realtime
-c class	2: best-effort
	3: idle
-n classdata	The realtime and best-effort can set from 0 to 7. A smaller value means the program has
	a higher priority.
-p PID	Process ID

```
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo ps -1
FS
      UID
            PID
                 PPID C PRI
                              NI ADDR SZ WCHAN
                                                TTY
                                                             TIME CMD
4 S
            895
                  886
                          80
                               0 - 1794 wait
                                                pts/0
                                                          00:00:00 bash
           1099
4 S
                  895
                          80
                                   1659 poll s pts/0
                                                          00:00:00 sudo
          1100
                                   1850 -
                 1099
                          80
                                                pts/0
                                                          00:00:00 ps
4 R
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo ionice -c 2 -n 0 -p 895
moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo ionice
                                      -p 895
best-effort: prio 0
```



NOTE

Click the following link for more information on usages of ionice https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/util-linux/ionice.1.en.html

Limiting the CPU Usage of a Process Using cpulimit

cpulimit is a simple program that attempts to limit the CPU usage of a process (expressed in percentage, not in CPU time). This is useful to control batch jobs, when you don't want them to eat too much CPU.

This example, use the cpulimit to limit the usage of sshd process CPU limit percentage to 25% in background. The -p is the process ID. The -e switch take the executable program file name. The -l is the CPU limit percentage. The option, -b, to run cpulimit in the background, freeing up the terminal.

moxa@moxa-tbbbb1182827:/# sudo cpulimit -p 895 -1 25 -b

ΝΟΤΕ

Click the following link for more information on usages of cpulimit https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/cpulimit/cpulimit.1.en.html

Limiting the Rate

Refer to the <u>Chapter 8 Security Firewall Rate Limiting</u> to customize the network limitation of the firewall configuration.

Audit Log

In this section, we will introduce the audit event log design in Moxa Industrial Linux and bootloader, including the security event monitored and recommended response and approach for audit processing failures.

Linux Audit log

Auditd is being used in Moxa Industrial Linux for system administrators to monitor detailed information about system operation. It provides a way to track and record security-relevant information on the system.

- 1. Log partition size: 256MB
- 2. Log partition applies Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) encryption and restrict non root user from access
- Logs are stored under /var/log/audit/ and the log format follows auditd standard.
 - > Below is a reference of where to find the commonly used log data fields in audit log

Common Log Data Fields	Data Fields in auditd log		
timestamp	msg=audit(TIMESTAMP)		
source	proctitle, comm, exec, uid, gid, etc.		
category	key		
type	type		
eventID	pid, ppid		

- 4. Audit log records are automatically rotated daily and up to 14 achieved logs are kept at a time. When log rotates, the oldest archive will be deleted if 14 achieved logs exist.
 - Audit log rotation rule can be modified in /etc/logrotate.d/auditd
- 5. The log timestamp is the local system time which synchronize with a remote Network Time Protocol (NTP) server.
 - > For time synchronization status and configuration, refers to timedatectl(1)

NOTE

Click the following link for more information on usages of auditd and log search https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/auditd/auditd.8.en.html https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/auditd/auditd.8.en.html

Below are the security events that Moxa Industrial Linux is pre-configured to monitor in Secure model of Moxa Arm-based computer

Event Category	Event Logged	File or Directory to Monitor	key used for ausearch
Access control	Users logins, logouts, system events, etc.	/var/run/utmp /var/run/btmp /var/run/wtmp	session
Backup and restore	Use of Moxa System Manager tool	/sbin/mx-system-mgmt	system_mgmt
	Shutdown system	/sbin/shutdown	system_mgmt
	Power off system	/sbin/poweroff	power
	Reboot system	/sbin/reboot	power
	Halt system	/sbin/halt	power
Control System	Use of APT package management system	/usr/bin/apt	system_package
	Use of aptitude tool	/usr/bin/aptitude	system_package
	Use of add-apt-repository tool	/usr/bin/apt-add-repository	system_package
	Use of apt-get tool	/usr/bin/apt-get	system_package
	Use of dpkg package manager tool	/usr/bin/dpkg	system_package
	Add user configuration change	/etc/adduser.conf	adduser
	AIDE configuration and	/etc/aide	aide
	database change	/var/lib/aide	aide-db
	Audit configuration and log	/etc/audit	auditconfig
	change	/var/log/audit	auditlog
	Login policy change	/etc/login.defs	login
	Log rotate configuration change	/etc/logrotate.conf /etc/logrotate.d	logrotate
	Moxa Computer Interface Management configuration change	/etc/moxa/ MoxaComputerInterfaceManager	mcim
	Moxa Connection Manger configuration change	/etc/moxa/MoxaConnectionManager	mcm
Security configurations	Moxa Guardian configuration change	/etc/moxa/MoxaConnectionManager /var/lib/moxa-guardian	moxa-guardian moxa-guardian- registry
	Password policy change	/etc/pam.d /etc/security/limits.conf /etc/security/limits.d /etc/security/faillock.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d	pam
	Linux system wide environment configuration change	/etc/profile /etc/profile.d	profile
	Rsyslog configuration change	/etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d	rsyslog
	SSH (Secure Shell) configuration change	/etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d	sshd
	Sudo configuration change	/etc/sudoers	sudo

Bootloader Audit Log

- 1. Log is stored in SPI flash with **1MB** storage size
- 2. Log can be viewed via (2) Advance Setting > (4) View Bootloader Log in Bootloader menu
- 3. Maximum number of logs is 4,000 records, where the oldest log will be overwritten when the maximum capacity is reached.
- 4. The time stamp of the log read from the local Real-time Clock (RTC) which is synchronize with Network Time Protocol (NTP) server.
- 5. Log format and log events are described below

Audit Log Structure

Header	Explanation	Possible Values				
Time	Time stamp of the device	Format: [YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss] For example: [2022-06-03T15:54:38]				
User	Identifies the authenticated user	Admin				
Category	Event category	 System Bootcfg (refers to boot configuration) Install Security 				
Event ID	ID of a logged event	1 ~ 15				
Event Message	Description of the logged event	See below table for the list of events				

Audit Events

Adult Event	Event ID	Event Type	Event Message	
Category			Event Message	
System	1	Info	All bootloader configuration set to default	
System	2	Info	Exit bootloader and reboot system	
System	3	Info	Exit bootloader and boot to Linux	
bootcfg	_4	Info	Set boot configuration to default ok	
bootcfg		Warning	Set boot configuration to default fail	
bootcfg	5	Info	Set boot from SD/USB/eMMC ok	
bootcfg	5	Warning	Set boot from SD/USB/eMMC fail	
bootcfg	6	Warning	USB is not available on this device	
bootcfg	7	Info	Bootarg and bootcmd changed	
Install		Info	Install system image from TFTP ok	
Install		Warning	Destination net unreachable	
Install		Warning	Hash/Signature file not find	
Install	8	Warning	System image file error	
Install		Warning	File size is too large	
Install		Warning	Upgrade system image fail	
Install	_	Alert	System image authenticity check fail	
Install		Info	Install system image from SD ok	
Install	_	Warning	SD/USB/eMMC device not find	
Install	_	Warning	Hash/Signature file not find	
Install	9	Warning	System image file error	
Install		Warning	File size is too large	
Install	_	Warning	Upgrade system image fail	
Install	-	Alert	System image authenticity check fail	
Secure		Info	Install system image from USB ok	
Secure	-	Warning	SD/USB/eMMC device not find	
Secure	_	Warning	Hash/Signature file not find	
Secure	10	Warning	System image file error	
	10	-		
Secure		Warning	File size is too large	
Secure		Warning	Upgrade system image fail	
Secure	4.4	Alert	System image authenticity check fail	
Secure	11	Info	TFTP setting changed	
Secure	12	Info	Login success	
Secure		Warning	login fail	
Secure	13	Alert	Boot failure due to system image integrity or authenticity check fail	
Secure	14	Info	Admin password disabled	
Secure	14	Info	Admin password enabled	
Secure	15	Info	Admin password set to default	
Secure	16	Info	Admin password changed	
Secure	17	Info	Admin password policy changed	
Secure	18	Info	Advance settings set to default	
Secure	19	Info	Auto reboot threshold changed	
Secure	20	Info	Login message changed	
Secure	21	Info	Invalid Login Attempts changed	
Secure		Info	Clear TPM ok	
Secure	22	Warning	Clear TPM fail	
Secure		warning		

Category	Event ID	Event Type	Event Message
audit	23	Info	View bootloader log ok

Audit Failure Response

The section is a guideline for protection of critical system functions in case of audit processing failure. Without appropriate response to audit processing failure, an attacker's activities can go unnoticed, and evidence of whether the attack led to a breach can be inconclusive. Following are some common approaches:

1. Log rotation

Log rotation is enabled by default in Moxa Arm-based computer to prevent audit storage capacity full. Refers to **Linux Audit Log** and **Bootloader Audit log** sections for details.

In Linux, configure the logrotate to limit the disk space usage to prevent running out of space. The logrotate configuration file is at /etc/logrotate.config and all the files in /etc/logrotate.d/* to rotate the log file.

This example we configure /etc/logrotate.d/rsyslog to rotate /var/log/syslog while it overs the size 2M with only 3 rotation.

/var/log/syslog		
{		
{		
rotate 3		
maxsize 2M		
• • •		
}		
}		

2. Saving the logs in external storage

- > For auditd, change the file path of parameter log_file in /etc/audit/auditd.conf
- > For rsyslog, change the default file path /var/log/ in /etc/rsyslog.conf to external storage

3. Use a centralized log Server

Use a centralized log managements system to collect and store the logs from Log from multiple devices. Refers to <u>How to Set Up Centralized Logging on Linux with Rsyslog</u>

4. Assign appropriate action when audit storage space is full, or error occurs

You can configure **space_left** and **space_left_action** parameters in **/etc/audit/auditd.conf** to specify the remaining space (in megabytes or %) for low disk alert and what action to take. The actions are ignore, syslog, rotate, exec, suspend, single, and halt.

In example below, warning email will be sent to email account specified in **action_mail_acct** parameter when the free space in the filesystem containing log files drop below 75 megabytes

space_left = 75
space_left_action = email

Configure **disk_full_action** and **disk_error_action** in **/etc/audit/auditd.conf** to specify what actions to take when audit storage disk got error or full. The actions are ignore, syslog, rotate (for disk full only), exec, suspend, single, and halt.

Refers to <u>auditd(8)</u> for detail explanation of each action and parameters.

Security Diagnosis Tool (Moxa Guardian)

The secure models of Moxa's Arm-based computer are secure-by-default and certified to IEC 62443-4-2 SL2. However, on many occasions, the default security settings are unintentionally changed and they no longer adhere to the standard, especially when conducting customization development on the computer.

Moxa Guardian is a security diagnosis tool that gives you an overview of the gap between the current security configurations based on the IEC 62443-4-2 Security Level 2 standards and the Moxa recommended security configurations. You can also use the tool to restore the security configurations to the default out-of-box secured configurations.

Use the **#** mx-guardian command to display the menu page.

```
Moxa Guardian is a cli tool allows users to operate security configs
Moxa Guardian is a CLI security diagnosis tool that gives you an overview of
the gap between the current security configurations against the IEC 62443-4-2
Security Level 2 host device requirement and the Moxa recommended security
configurations.
Usage:
 mx-guardian [command]
Available Commands:
           Diagnose security settings and output report
 diagnose
             Help about any command
 help
             Apply a pre-defined security profile
 set
              Show Moxa Guardian version and build info
 version
Flags:
  -f, --force
                  force mode
  -h, --help
                  help for mx-guardian
      --no-color
                  disable color
                  quiet mode (imply force)
  -q, --quiet
  -v, --verbose
                  verbose mode
      --version
                   get version
Use "mx-guardian [command] --help" for more information about a command.
```

ATTENTION

As the Moxa computer is an open platform that allows users to install any software they desire, Moxa Guardian's diagnosis tool only compares the current configurations against the default out-of-box IEC 62443-4-2 compliance configurations. For example, if additional protocols are installed, Moxa Guardian will not diagnose such protocols' communication integrity and authenticity capabilities. It is the responsibility of the user to follow the hardening guidelines and the IEC 62443 standard to meet the security requirements.

Diagnosing Issues in the Current Security Configuration

Use **# mx-guardian diagnose <flags>** to initiate a diagnosis of the current security configurations against the default out-of-box secured configuration, which include all IEC 62443-4-2 security level 2 compliance configurations and also additional Moxa recommended security setting not covered in IEC 62443 standard. The diagnosed result are shown in the sequential orders of IEC 62443-4-2 requirement (CR 1.1 to CR 7.8), followed by Moxa's recommended security settings.

Flags	Description	
-d or -detail	Show details including the reason and guideline for the failed	
	requirements	
-h or -help	Print the help menu for diagnose command	
-o or -output <target filepath=""></target>	Output the diagnose result to a file	

The diagnosis result could be one of the following:

- PASS: The device's security configuration meets the IEC 62443-4-2 security level 2 standard or Moxa recommended setting.
- **FAIL:** The device's security configuration fails to meet the IEC 62443-4-2 security level 2 standard or Moxa recommended setting.
- **INFO:** The device's security configuration meet the IEC 62443-4-2 security level 2 standard but additional configuration can be applied if suitable.

An example of Moxa Guardian's diagnosis output is given below:

root@moxa-tbbbb1182816:/home/moxa# mx-guardian diagnose -d	
INF0[2022-11-14T12:19:33Z] start diagnosing requirement INF0[2022-11-14T12:19:33Z] diagnose requirement all detail=true	

As the Moxa computer is an open platform that allows users to install any software they desire, Moxa Guardian's diagnosis tool only compares the current configurations against the default out-of-box IEC-62443-4-2 compliance configurations	

CR 1.1: Human user identification and authentication	
[+] Precondition > Package	
- openssh-server - openssh-client - libpam-modules	[PASS] [PASS] [PASS]
<pre>[+] Check > Option: SSHD:UsePAM - info: Check UsePAM is set to yes in sshd - guide: Modifiy or add "UsePAM yes" in /etc/ssh/sshd_config or /etc/sshd/sshd_conf</pre>	[PASS]
CR 1.2: Software process and device identification and authentication	
 [+] Precondition	
> Package - openssh-server - libpam-modules	[PASS] [PASS]
[+] Check	[DACC]
> Option: SSHD:UsePAM - info: Check UsePAM is set to yes in sshd	[PASS]
 guide: Modify or add "UsePAM yes" in /etc/ssh/sshd_config or /etc/sshd/sshd_confi Option: SSHD:PubKeyAuthentication info: Check PubkeyAuthentication is set to yes in sshd guide: Modify or add "PubkeyAuthentication yes" in /etc/ssh/sshd_config or /etc/sshd/sshd_config.d/*.conf 	.g.d/*.conf [PASS]
CR 1.3: Account management	
[+] Precondition > Package	
- passwd	[PASS]
CR 1.4: Identifier management	
[+] Precondition > Package	
- base-passwd - passwd	[PASS] [PASS]
CR 1.5: Authenticator management	

Restoring the Security Configuration to the Default

Use **#** mx-guardian set <command> <flags> to restore the Moxa Arm-based security configuration to the to the default out-of-box IEC 62443-4-2 compliance secured configurations.

Command	Description		
secure	Restore the Moxa Arm-based configuration to a pre-defined security profile		
Flags	Description		
-d or -detail	Show details including the reason and guideline for the failed requirements		
-h or –help	Print the help menu		
	The <string> parameter support 2 values (m1 or m2)</string>		
	Description of each mode is given below :		
-m ormode <string></string>	M1: Apply only the IEC 62443-4-2 security level 2 required settings		
	M2: Apply both M1 and Moxa recommended settings		
	Note : M2 is the default out-of-box security setting		

An example of restoring the computer's security profile to M2 (IEC 62443-4-2 security level 2 and Moxa recommended settings) is give below:

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ sudo mx-guardian set secure -m m2 INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] start setting secure command INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] apply all changes with force=false mode="IEC62443-4-2 and MOXA suggested settings" quiet=false INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/adduser.conf INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/audit/auditd.conf INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/profile.d/99-moxa-profile.conf INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/security/faillock.conf INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/99-moxa-pwquality.conf INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/login.defs INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/logrotate.d/00-moxa-logrotate.conf INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/ssh/sshd config.d/00-moxa-sshd.conf INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/sysctl.d/99-moxa-sysctl.conf INFO[2022-11-10T05:53:51Z] no changes file=/etc/rsyslog.d/99-moxa-rsyslog.conf

Attention : you must reboot your computer for the changes to take effect

ATTENTION

You must reboot your computer for the changes to take effect.

In this chapter, we will provide guidance on how to deploy and operate <u>Secure model</u> of Moxa Arm-based computer in a secure manner

Defense-in-depth Strategy

Security	Security Measures	Threat mitigated/handled	Responsibility	
Layer		Inneat mitigated/nanuled	Responsibility	
Policy and procedure	Establish policies and procedures to guide employee on their role and responsibilities to for safe use	Vulnerabilities created due to employee lack of security policies and procedures awareness	-Asset owner (Essential)	
	of security sensitive assets. Refers to <u>Operation</u> and <u>Maintenance</u> section for some recommendations	Malicious code attack that could create or exploit system vulnerabilities (<u>Threat ID #6</u>)		
	Use LTE service provide with Carrier Grade NAT (CGNAT) and firewall	Unauthorized and malicious communications from untrusted network	Asset owner (Essential)	
Perimeter Security	Perimeter firewall	Unauthorized and malicious communications from untrusted network	Asset owner	
	Physical security (Refers to section <u>Physical</u> <u>Installation</u>)	Physical modification, manipulation, theft, removal, or destruction of asset	(Essential)	
Network	Network IDS/IPS	Network attacks from various sources such as port scanning, DDOS, etc.	Asset owner (Recommended)	
Security	VPN	Man-in-the-middle attacks that allow hackers to intercept and manipulate network traffic (<u>Threat</u> <u>ID #4</u>)		
	End point Firewall (<u>nftable</u>)	Unauthorized and malicious communications from untrusted network (<u>Threat ID #2</u> , <u>Threat ID #5</u>)		
	Brute-force attacks IPS (<u>fail2ban</u>)	Trial and error attack attempting to crack login credentials (<u>Threat ID</u> <u>#3</u>)	Provided by Moxa Arm-based	
Endpoint Security	Automatic network Connection failover (Refers to <u>MCM</u> failover configuration)	Radio jamming attack (<u>Threat ID</u> <u>#1</u>)	Computer	
	Patch management	Vulnerabilities from outdated software could expose to security breach.		
	Secure transmission protocol	Man-in-the-middle attacks that allow hackers to intercept and manipulate network traffic (<u>Threat</u> <u>ID #4</u>)	Asset owner / Moxa Arm-based Computer (Essential)	

Security Layer	Security Measures	Threat mitigated/handled	Responsibility	
	Audit processing failure response	Audit processing failure without appropriate response results in the attacker's activities can go unnoticed, and evidence of whether the attack led to a breach can be inconclusive (<u>Threat ID #7</u>)		
Application Security	IEC 62443-4-1 certified secure design, implementation, validation, and defect management process	Potential vulnerabilities generated from development and testing process that doesn't follow the security best practices.	Provided by Moxa Arm-based Compute	
Data Security	Host Intrusion Detection System (<u>AIDE</u>)	Unexpected changes to important files that could potentially lead to security breach.		
	Access control and login policy including limit invalid login attempts, automatic session termination and login banner	Unauthorize operation to Moxa Arm- based computer that could lead to system confidentiality and integrity breach or availability attack.	Provided by Moxa Arm-based Computer	
	Disk encryption	Access to confidential data in storage without authorization.		
	Secure boot	Tampering of bootloader, OS kernel and rootFS.		

Table 9.1 – Defense-in-Depth Strategy

*Essential: Security measure that must be taken by asset owner to ensure secure use of Moxa Arm-based computer *Recommended: Security measures that need to be taken by the asset owner if the threats apply.

Potential Threats and Corresponding Security Measures

Below is a list of potential security threats that can harm Moxa Arm-based computers and the corresponding security measures that need to be taken by the **asset owner** if the threats apply.

Threat ID	Threat mitigated/handled	Security Measures
1	Radio jamming attack resulting in Wi-Fi and cellular connection DOS	 For Moxa Arm-based computer with both Wi-Fi and cellular interface, configure <u>connection failover</u> to use backup connection when primary connection is attack by radio jamming Extend the perimeter of physical security to reduce the impact from radio jamming attack
2	Network data flow through ethernet, Wi-Fi, cellular interface could be potentially interrupted, crashed or stopped by DOS attack	 Setup <u>network monitoring tool</u> to detect abnormal traffic Configure <u>rate limiting</u> to limit the network traffic
3	SSH server could be potentially interrupted, crashed or stopped by DOS attack	 Following parameters are set in SSH server configuration file by Moxa as countermeasure. MaxSessions: set to 6 to protect a system from denial of service due to a large number of concurrent sessions MaxStartups: set to 6:30:60 to protect a system from denial of service due to a large number of pending authentication connection attempts Fail2ban is pre-installed and running in Moxa Arm- based computer to automatically ban malicious IP
4	Data flowing across ethernet may be sniffed by an attacker	 Make sure secure protocol with encryption and authentication are used for data transmission (e.g., SSHv2, HTTPS) Install and use VPN for secure data transmission
5	DOS attack from untrusted NTP server when Moxa Arm-based computer attempt to synchronize time	If a public NTP server without NTS support is used, it is vulnerable to an NTP amplification attack which the attacker could exploit public NTP servers to overwhelm Moxa Arm- based computer with UDP traffic; therefore, refers to <u>Mitigate NTP Amplification Attack</u> to mitigate it.

Threat ID	Threat mitigated/handled	Security Measures		
6	Data read from USB or SD card could be spoofed	 Use sha256 or other checksums tools to check the integrity of the file before installing or transferring to device. If the file is Debian package (.deb), refers to <u>"How to manually check for package's integrity</u>" to validate. Scan the file with <u>Clamav</u> before installing or transferring it to the device Use <u>OpenSSL</u> to verify the signature of the file before installing or transferring to the device. 		
7	Insufficient auditing storage causing logs to rotate frequently	Store log in external storage or use a centralized log managements system to collect and store the logs from multiple devices. Refers to <u>How to Set Up Centralized</u> <u>Logging on Linux with Rsyslog</u>		

Installation

Physical Installation

- 1. Secure model of Moxa Arm-based computer MUST be used to ensure safe use. Refer to <u>Secure and</u> <u>Standard Model</u> for details of model difference.
- The secure model of Moxa Arm-based computer MUST be protected by physical security that can include CCTV surveillance, security guards, protective barriers, locks, access control, perimeter intrusion detection, etc. The proper form of physical security should apply depending on the environment and the physical attack risk level.
- 3. Moxa Arm-based computer has anti-tamper labels on the enclosures. This allows the administrator to tell whether the device has been tampered with.
- 4. Moxa Arm-based computer uses security screw on the enclosures as physical tamper resistance measure to increase the difficulty of probing the product internals in case of physical security breach.
- 5. Moxa Arm-based computer MUST not be used to **control** the operation of mission-critical IACS component which failure to maintain control of such device could result in threat to human, safety, environment or massive financial lost.

Environment Requirement

- If Moxa Arm-based computer connects to untrust network (e.g., Internet) via ethernet or Wi-Fi, it MUST NOT directly connected to the untrust network, which means a firewall must be setup between ethernet and Wi-Fi connection from Moxa Arm-based computer and the untrust network.
- 2. For security-critical applications, we strongly recommend using a private APN for cellular networks.

Access Control

- The default user account **Moxa** of Linux belongs to the sudo group. Before deploying Moxa Arm-based computer after development, you must disable this default account and create new account(s) following the least privilege principle, granting only the necessary access right and permission for the intended operation.
- Each account should be assigned the correct privileges. Moxa Industrial Linux uses Discretionary Access Control (DAC) based on Access Control Lists (ACLs) to manage permissions and privileges. Refers to <u>Permissions and Privileges Control</u> for details.
- 3. The default password policy requires the password to be at least 8 characters in length. We strongly recommend keeping the default setting, or you can reduce the password length by adding additional complexity rules to the password, such as special character or numeric character enforcement. Refers to instructions to configure the policy for Linux and Bootloader, respectively.
- 4. Update user passwords on a timely manner. For administrator, we recommend refreshing password at least every 3 months.

- 5. <u>Bootloader configuration menu</u> comes with a single administrator account shared by all users. Asset owner MUST have access and identity records of the personnel who accessed the bootloader to ensure non-repudiation in case of security breach incidents.
- 6. Below is a list of all services in Moxa Arm-based computer uses to connect with external processes and components.

Service	Protocol	Interfaces	Owner (uid/gid)	Authorization Enforcement
SSH server	SSH	Ethernet, cellular, Wi-Fi	root/root	Yes
SFTP server	SSH	Ethernet, cellular, Wi-Fi	root/root	Yes
SCP server	SSH	Ethernet, cellular, Wi-Fi	root/root	Yes
Serial Getty service	RS-232	Serial console port	root/root	Yes
APT client	HTTPS	Ethernet, cellular, Wi-Fi	root/root	Yes
NTP client (NTS support)	TLS/SSL, NTP	Ethernet, cellular, Wi-Fi	root/root	Yes

Security Configuration Check

The secure models of Moxa's Arm-based computer are secure-by-default and certified to IEC 62443-4-2 SL2. However, on many occasions, the default security settings are unintentionally changed and they no longer adhere to the standard, especially when conducting customization development on the computer.

Moxa Guardian is a security diagnosis tool that gives you an overview of the gap between the current security configurations based on the IEC 62443-4-2 Security Level 2 standards and the Moxa recommended security configurations. Make sure you run the security diagnosis before deploying the product. Refer to <u>Security Diagnosis Tool</u> section for details usage of Moxa Guardian

Operation

Administrator

1. Disable default account

Use the **passwd** command to lock the default user account so that the **moxa** user cannot log in. Make sure to create a new account before disable the default account

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:# sudo passwd -1 moxa

2. Disabled interfaces that are not in use

The interfaces that are not in use should be deactivated. Please refer to <u>Disabled Unused Interface</u> for detailed instructions.

3. Periodically regenerate the SSH server key

Periodically regenerate the SSH server key in order to secure your system in case the key is compromised. Please refer to $\frac{\mathsf{Rekey}\;\mathsf{SSH}}{\mathsf{Rekey}\;\mathsf{SSH}}$

4. Trusted administrator

Make sure only trusted and reliable persons are registered in the sudo groups for root privilege.

5. Audit failure response

Refer to <u>Audit Failure Response Guideline</u> to protection of critical system functions in case of audit processing failure

6. System integrity validation

- Frequently run system integrity check to protect your system against malware, viruses and detect unauthorized activities. Refers to <u>Intrusion Detection System</u> for the utility that come with Moxa Arm-based computer
- We recommend you reset Moxa Arm-based computer to <u>factory default</u> upon receiving it to avoid the risk of potential software tampering before the computer reaches your hand.

7. Only use secure cryptographic

Moxa Industrial Linux on Moxa Arm-based computer only uses secure cryptographic that are commonly accepted industry best practices and recommendations as defined in NIST SP 800-57. Moxa Industrial Linux installed OpenSSL by default but doesn't disable weak algorithms such as TLS 1.0/1.1 and SSLv3. It is recommended that your application deployed on Moxa Industrial Linux only uses secure algorithms defined in NIST SP 800-57. You can disable the weaker cryptographic algorithm in OpenSSI by setting CipherString = DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=[desired level] in /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf to a higher level. For details, refers to : https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL CTX set security level.html

8. Malicious code protection

- > Downloading file from untrusted sources is not recommended. If you still want to do it, make sure to verify the file using following recommendation:
 - Use sha256 or stronger algorithms checksums tools to check the integrity of the file before installing or transferring to device
 - □ If the file is Debian package (.deb), follow "<u>How to manually check for package's integrity</u>" for the instruction.
 - □ Use <u>OpenSSL</u> to verify the signature of the file before installing or transferring to the device.

Administrator and User

1. Periodically refresh password

Update user passwords on a timely manner. For administrator, we recommend refreshing password at least every 3 months

2. Encrypt confidential file

Use GPG to encrypt confidential file or directory with a password in Linux. You can reference <u>How To</u> <u>Encrypt And Decrypt Files With A Password</u> for quick instructions.

Maintenance

1. Perform Update Frequently

- > Perform software upgrades frequently to enhance features, deploy security patches, or fix bugs.
- > We recommend you enable <u>System Failback Recovery</u> before performing critical update.
- 2. Perform Backup Frequently

Frequently backup of system on timely manner

3. Examine Audit Logs Frequently

Examine audit logs frequently to detect any anomalies.

4. Report Vulnerability to Moxa

To report vulnerabilities of Moxa products, please submit your findings on the following web page: <u>https://www.moxa.com/en/support/product-support/security-advisory/report-a-vulnerability</u>.

Decommissioning

 To avoid any sensitive information such as your account password or certificate from being disclosed, always use the mx-system-mgmt default decommission command to reset the computer to factory default and further wipe out all user data, including logs, in an unrecoverable manner before removing the Moxa Arm-based computer from .

You must use sudo or run the command with the root permission.

moxa@moxa-tbzkb1090923:/# sudo mx-system-mgmt default decommission

The decommissioning process will do the following actions :

- a. Overwrite the system partition 4 times with <u>shred</u> so that all user files will be deleted and cannot be recovered.
- b. Overwrite the log partition4 times with <u>shred</u> so that all log files will be deleted and cannot be recovered.
- c. Trigger the bootloader decommissioning function, so all configurations and log messages in the bootloader are also deleted and cannot be recovered.
- 2. If asset owner key or sensitive data is stored in the TPM, switch to bootloader <u>Developer Mode</u> and then perform <u>Clear TPM</u> action will clear all data stored in TPM

MIL1 (Debian 9) to MIL3 (Debian 11) Migration

Moxa Arm-based computers with MIL1 (Debian 9) does not support direct upgrade to MIL3 (Debian 11). If you have such request, contact your regional sales representative.

If you are migrating an application previously developed on MIL1 to MIL3 please reference the below table for the major changes.

Category	Description	MIL1 (Debian 9)	MIL3 (Debian 11)	
Password rule	Password change enforced upon first log-in	n/a		
	Password complexity enforcement	n/a	At least 8 characters in length Password dictionary check	
	Reinstall a system image	Via bootloader menu	Via bootloader menu	
Backup & Store	Create a backup & restore	n/a	<u>Moxa System Manager (MSM)</u> utility	
utilities	Create a snapshot & restore	n/a	Moxa System Management (MSM) utility under Linux	
	Automatic system failback recovery	n/a	Moxa System Management (MSM) utility under Linux	
	Default LAN (ethernet) port configuration	LAN1(static IP):192.168.3.127 LAN2(static IP):192.168.4.127	 LAN1: Assigned by DHCP server. Link-local IP addresses will be assigned when DHCP server is not available LAN2(static IP):192.168.4.127 	
	Cellular connection utility	Use cell_mgmt	Use mx-interface-mgmt Refers to <u>Moxa Connection Manager</u>	
Network connection utilities	Wi-Fi connection utility	Use wifi_mgmt	 (MCM) with additional features added below: GUI to configure and manage network Connection keep-alive Connection failover/failback Cellular, Wi-Fi and ethernet management DHCP server Data usage monitoring IPv6 support Cellular connection diagnosis Cellular modem firmware upgrade C API for network and connection status inquiry 	
	Serial port mode change (RS-232, RS-422, and RS-485 2-wire)	Use mx-uart-ctl		
I/O and Interface Management utilities	Module control including power control, module detection, initialize setting, and SIM slot switching	Use mx-module-ctl or cell_mgmt for cellular module control	Use mx-interface-mgmt Refers to serial port in <u>Moxa Computer</u> <u>Interface Manager (MCIM)</u> section	
	Buzzer control LED control	n/a Use mx-led-ctl		
	Digital I/O control	Use moxa-dio-control		

Category	Description	MIL1 (Debian 9)	MIL3 (Debian 11)	
	Mount a SD/USB	Use moxa-auto-		
	storage device	mountd.service		
	Push button control	n/a		
	Check product serial	Use fw_printenv	Use mx-interface-mgmt deviceinfo	
	number	serialnumber	Use mx-interface-mgmt devicemito	
	Check system image	Use kversion or mx-ver	Use mx-ver	
Other	version	Use eversion of mx-ver	use mx-ver	
Configuration			3rd party repository in	
	APT repository source	All repository in	/etc/apt/sources.list	
	list	/etc/apt/sources.list	Moxa repository in	
			/etc/apt/sources.list.d/moxa.list	
			API and libraries not available. Use	
API and	Moxa Platform	1	mx-interface-mgmt	
libraries	Libraries	*	Refers to Moxa Computer Interface	
			Manager (MCIM)	

Building an Application

Introduction

Moxa's Arm-based computers support both native and cross-compiling of code. Native compiling is more straightforward since all the coding and compiling can be done directly on the device. However, Arm architecture is less powerful and hence the compiling speed is slower. To overcome this, you can cross compile your code on a Linux machine using a toolchain; the compiling speed is much faster.

Native Compilation

Follow these steps to update the package menu:

- 1. Make sure a network connection is available.
- 2. Use **aptupdate** to update the Debian package list.

moxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ sudo apt update

3. Install the native compiler and necessary packages. moxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$ sudo apt install gcc build-essential flex bison automake

Cross Compilation



Moxa Industrial Linux (MIL) in Moxa's Arm-based computers is based on Debian. So, we recommend setting up a Debian environment on the host device to ensure best compatibility during cross compilation.

The toolchain will need about 300 MB of hard disk space on your PC.

To cross compile your code, do the following:

- 1. Set up a Debian 10 environment using a VM or Docker.
- 2. Update the information.
 - user@Linux:~\$ apt update
- (Optional) During the update process, if you don't want to see messages related to "server certificate verification failed", you can install Moxa apt **keyring**. These messages, however, will not affect the operation.

user@Linux:~\$ apt install moxa-archive-keyring

4. In order to install non-amd64 packages, such as armhf and u386, add the external architecture. In the example, we are adding the armhf architecture.

user@Linux:~\$ dpkg --add-architecture armhf

5. Update the apt information again.

user@Linux:~\$ apt update

6. Download the toolchain file from apt server (all Moxa UC series computers use the official Debian toolchain).

user@Linux:~\$ apt install crossbuild-essential-armhf

7. Install **dev** or **lib** packages depending on whether Debian or Moxa packages are applicable for the procedure.

Example for installing a Debian official package:

user@Linux:~\$ apt install libssl-dev:armhf

You can now start compiling programs using the toolchain.



NOTE

For all available libraries and headers offered by Debian, visit: <u>https://packages.debian.org/index</u>.

Example Program—hello

In this section, we use the standard "hello" example program to illustrate how to develop a program for Moxa computers. All example codes can be downloaded from Moxa's website. The "hello" example code is available in the **hello** folder; hello/hello.c:

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    printf("Hello World\n");
    return 0;
```

Native Compilation

1. Compile the hello.c code.

```
moxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~$ gcc -o hello hello.c
moxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~$ strip -s hello
or
use the Makefile as follows:
moxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~$ make
2. Run the program.
```

moxa@Moxa-tbzkb1090923:~\$./hello
Hello World

Cross Compiling

1. Compile the hello.c code.





2. Copy the program to a Moxa computer:

For example, if the IP address of your device used for cross compiling the code is "192.168.3.100" and the IP address of the Moxa computer is "192.168.3.127", use the following command:



Example Makefile

You can create a Makefile for the "hello" example program using the following code. By default, the Makefile is set for native compiling.

"hello/Makefile":



To set the hello.c program for cross compilation, modify the toolchain settings as follows:

```
CC:=arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc
STRIP:=arm-linux-gnueabihf-strip
```

Creating a Customized Image

Introduction

This section introduces how to build a customized image that set the push-button on Moxa Computer to reset to customized environment instead of Moxa out-of-factory setting. This customized image can also be used for provisioning other Moxa Computers.



Using System Snapshots and Backups

- 1. Configure Moxa Arm-based computer and install application
- 2. Create a <u>Snapshot</u>
- Reference <u>Customize the Button Action</u> section to configure the action of push-button on Moxa Armbased computer to restore Snapshot
 - > Copy content of default script to custom.script, change to reset-to-default
 - Change to set-to-factory-default command (mx-system-mgmt default restore y) of button to restore snapshot (mx-system-mgmt snapshot restore -y)



- 4. Create a Backup Image, the backup will include the snapshot taken in step #2
- 5. The Backup Image can now be used for provisioning other Moxa computers of the same model using <u>backup restore</u> command.

Software Process for Adminstrator	UID	GID
addgnupghome	root	root
addgroup	root	root
add-shell	root	root
adduser	root	root
agetty	root	root
applygnupgdefaults	root	root
arp	root	root
arpd	root	root
audisp-syslog	root	root
auditctl	root	root
auditd	root	root
augenrules	root	root
aureport	root	root
ausearch	root	root
autrace	root	root
badblocks	root	root
blkdeactivate	root	root
blkdiscard	root	root
blkid	root	root
blkzone	root	root
blockdev	root	root
bridge	root	root
capsh	root	root
cfdisk	root	root
chcpu	root	root
chgpasswd	root	root
chmem		
chpasswd	root root	root
		root
chronyd	root	root
chroot	root	root
cpgr	root	root
cppw		root
cracklib-check	root	root
cracklib-format	root	root
cracklib-packer	root	root
cracklib-unpacker	root	root
create-cracklib-dict	root	root
ctrlaltdel	root	root
debugfs	root	root
delgroup	root	root
deluser	root	root
depmod	root	root
devlink	root	root
dhclient	root	root
dhclient-script	root	root
dmsetup	root	root
dmstats	root	root
dnsmasq	root	root
docfdisk	root	root
doc_loadbios	root	root

Below is a list of software processes of Moxa Industrial Linux in Moxa Arm-based Computer

dpkg-fsys-usrunmessrodpkg-preconfigurerodpkg-reconfigurero	oot	GID root
dpkg-preconfigure ro dpkg-reconfigure ro		
dpkg-reconfigure ro		root
		root
-		root
		root
-		root
		root
		root
		root
-		root
		root
· · · ·		root
		root
fsck.ext3 ro	oot	root
fsck.ext4 ro	oot	root
fsck.minix ro	oot	root
fsfreeze ro	oot	root
fstab-decode ro	oot	root
fstrim ro	oot	root
ftl_check ro	oot	root
ftl_format ro	oot	root
genl ro	oot	root
getcap ro	oot	root
getpcaps ro	oot	root
getty ro	oot	root
groupadd ro	oot	root
groupdel ro	oot	root
groupmems ro	oot	root
groupmod ro	oot	root
grpck ro	oot	root
grpconv ro	oot	root
grpunconv ro	oot	root
halt ro	oot	root
hwclock ro	oot	root
iconvconfig ro	oot	root
-	oot	root
ifdown ro	oot	root
	oot	root
ifup ro	oot	root
init ro	oot	root

Software Process for Adminstrator	UID	GID
insmod	root	root
installkernel	root	root
invoke-rc.d	root	root
ip	root	root
ipmaddr	root	root
iptunnel	root	root
isosize	root	root
iw	root	root
jffs2dump	root	root
jffs2reader	root	root
killall5	root	root
Idattach	root	root
Idconfig	root	root
locale-gen	root	root
logrotate	root	root
logsave	root	root
losetup Ismod	root	root root
Ismod		
	root	root
lxfp	root	root
mcmd	root	root
mii-tool	root	root
mke2fs	root	root
mkfs	root	root
mkfs.bfs	root	root
mkfs.cramfs	root	root
mkfs.ext2	root	root
mkfs.ext3	root	root
mkfs.ext4	root	root
mkfs.jffs2	root	root
mkfs.minix	root	root
mkfs.ubifs	root	root
mkhomedir_helper	root	root
mklost+found	root	root
mkswap	root	root
ModemManager	root	root
modinfo	root	root
modprobe	root	root
MoxaComputerInterfaceManager	root	root
moxa-telit-firmware-upgrade-tool	root	root
mtd_debug	root	root
mtdinfo	root	root
mtdpart	root	root
mx-bootloader-mgmt	root	root
mx-connect-mgmt	root	root
mx-guardian	root	root
mx-guardian-init	root	root
mx-system-mgmt	root	root
nameif	root	root
nanddump	root	root
nandtest	root	root
nandwrite	root	root
NetworkManager	root	root
newusers	root	root
nft	root	root
nftldump	root	root
nftl_format	root	root
nologin	root	root
	1	-

Software Process for Adminstrator	UID	GID
pam-auth-update	root	root
pam_getenv	root	root
pam_timestamp_check	root	root
parted	root	root
partprobe	root	root
pivot_root	root	root
plipconfig	root	root
poweroff	root	root
pwck	root	root
pwconv	root	root
pwunconv	root	root
rarp	root	root
raw	root	root
readprofile	root	root
reboot	root	root
recv_image	root	root
regdbdump	root	root
remove-shell	root	root
resize2fs	root	root
rfddump	root	root
rfdformat	root	root
rmmod	root	root
rmt	root	root
rmt-tar	root	root
route	root	root
rsyslogd	root	root
rtacct	root	root
rtcwake	root	root
rtmon	root	root
runlevel	root	root
runuser	root	root
serve_image	root	root
service	root	root
setcap	root	root
sfdisk	root	root
shadowconfig	root	root
shutdown	root	root
slattach	root	root
sshd	root	root
start-stop-daemon	root	root
sudo_logsrvd	root	root
sudo_logs/vu sudo_sendlog	root	root
sulogin	root	root
sumtool	root	root
swaplabel	root	root
swapiabel	root	root
swapon	root	root
switch_root	root	root
sysctl	root	root
tarcat	root	root
tc	root	root
telinit	root	root
tipc	root	root
tune2fs	root	root
tzconfig	root	root
ubiattach	root	root
ubiblock	root	root
ubicrc32	root	root

Software Process for Adminstrator	UID	GID
ubidetach	root	root
ubiformat	root	root
ubihealthd	root	root
ubimkvol	root	root
ubinfo	root	root
ubinize	root	root
ubirename	root	root
ubirmvol	root	root
ubirsvol	root	root
ubiupdatevol	root	root
unix_chkpwd	root	shadow
unix_update	root	root
update-ca-certificates	root	root
update-cracklib	root	root
update-locale	root	root
update-passwd	root	root
update-rc.d	root	root
useradd	root	root
userdel	root	root
usermod	root	root
validlocale	root	root
vigr	root	root
vipw	root	root
visudo	root	root
vnstatd	root	root
watchdog	root	root
wd_identify	root	root
wd_keepalive	root	root
wipefs	root	root
wpa_action	root	root
wpa_cli	root	root
wpa_supplicant	root	root
zic	root	root
zramctl	root	root

Software Process for Non-Adminstrator	UID	GID
addpart	root	root
addr2line	root	root
aide	root	root
apt	root	root
apt-cache	root	root
apt-cdrom	root	root
apt-config	root	root
apt-extracttemplates	root	root
apt-ftparchive	root	root
apt-get	root	root
apt-key	root	root
apt-mark	root	root
apt-sortpkgs	root	root
ar	root	root
arch	root	root
arm-linux-gnueabihf-addr2line	root	root
arm-linux-gnueabihf-ar	root	root
arm-linux-gnueabihf-as	root	root
arm-linux-gnueabihf-c++filt	root	root
arm-linux-gnueabihf-dwp	root	root
arm-linux-gnueabihf-elfedit	root	root

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chagerootshadowchattrrootrootchconrootrootchfnrootrootchgrprootrootchmodrootrootchoomrootroot			
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chconrootrootchfnrootrootchgrprootrootchmodrootrootchoomrootroot			
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chmod root root choom root root			
choom root root			
Icnown Iroot Iroot			
chronyc root root			
chrt root root	cnrt	root	root

Software Process for		
Non-Adminstrator	UID	GID
chsh	root	root
cksum	root	root
clear	root	root
clear_console	root	root
cmp	root	root
col	root	root
colcrt	root	root
colrm	root	root
column	root	root
comm	root	root
corelist	root	root
ср	root	root
cpan	root	root
cpan5.32-arm-linux-gnueabihf	root	root
cpulimit	root	root
c_rehash	root	root
csplit	root	root
ctstat	root	root
curl	root	root
cut	root	root
cvtsudoers	root	root
dash	root	root
date	root	root
dbus-cleanup-sockets	root	root
dbus-daemon	root	root
dbus-monitor	root	root
dbus-run-session	root	root
dbus-send	root	root
dbus-update-activation-environment	root	root
dbus-uuidgen	root	root
dd	root	root
debconf	root	root
debconf-apt-progress	root	root
debconf-communicate	root	root
debconf-copydb	root	root
debconf-escape	root	root
debconf-set-selections	root	root
debconf-show	root	root
debsums	root	root
deb-systemd-helper	root	root
deb-systemd-invoke	root	root
delpart	root	root
df	root	root
dh_bash-completion	root	root
dialog	root	root
diff	root	root
diff3	root	root
dir	root	root
dircolors	root	root
dirmngr	root	root
dirmngr-client	root	root
dirname	root	root
dmesg	root	root
dnsdomainname	root	root
domainname	root	root
dpkg	root	root
dpkg-deb	root	root
-F		

Software Process for		
Non-Adminstrator	UID	GID
dpkg-divert	root	root
dpkg-maintscript-helper	root	root
dpkg-query	root	root
dpkg-realpath	root	root
dpkg-split	root	root
dpkg-statoverride	root	root
dpkg-trigger	root	root
du	root	root
dumpimage	root	root
dwp	root	root
echo	root	root
editor	root	root
egrep	root	root
elfedit	root	root
enc2xs	root	root
encguess	root	root
env	root	root
ex	root	root
expand	root	root
expiry	root	shadow
	root	root
expr factor	root	root
fail2ban-client		root
	root root	
fail2ban-python		root
fail2ban-regex	root	root
fail2ban-server	root	root
fail2ban-testcases	root	root
faillog	root	root
fallocate	root	root
FALSE	root	root
fgrep	root	root
file	root	root
fincore	root	root
find	root	root
findmnt	root	root
flock	root	root
fmt	root	root
fold	root	root
free	root	root
fw_printenv	root	root
fw_setenv	root	root
getconf	root	root
getent	root	root
getfacl	root	root
getopt	root	root
gold	root	root
gpasswd	root	root
gpg	root	root
gpg-agent	root	root
gpgcompose	root	root
gpgconf	root	root
gpg-connect-agent	root	root
gpgparsemail	root	root
gpgsm	root	root
gpgsplit	root	root
gpgtar	root	root
gpgv	root	root

Software Process for Non-Adminstrator	UID	GID
gpg-wks-server	root	root
gpg-zip	root	root
gprof	root	root
grep	root	root
groups	root	root
gunzip	root	root
gzexe	root	root
gzip	root	root
h2ph	root	root
h2xs	root	root
hd	root	root
head	root	root
helpztags	root	root
hexdump	root	root
hostid	root	root
hostname	root	root
hostnamectl	root	root
iconv	root	root
id	root	root
infocmp	root	root
infotocap	root	root
install		
	root	root
instmodsh	root	root
ionice	root	root
ip is see to	root	root
ipcmk	root	root
ipcrm	root	root
ipcs	root	root
ischroot	root	root
isotpdump	root	root
isotpperf	root	root
isotprecv	root	root
isotpsend	root	root
isotpserver	root	root
isotpsniffer	root	root
isotptun	root	root
j1939acd	root	root
j1939cat	root	root
j1939spy	root	root
j1939sr	root	root
join	root	root
journalctl	root	root
jq	root	root
json_pp	root	root
kbxutil	root	root
kernel-install	root	root
kill	root	root
kmod	root	root
kwboot	root	root
last	root	root
lastb	root	root
lastlog	root	root
lcf	root	root
ld	root	root
ld.bfd	root	root
ldd	root	root
ld.gold	root	root
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Software Process for	UID	GID
Non-Adminstrator		GID
libnetcfg	root	root
link	root	root
linux32	root	root
linux64	root	root
In	root	root
Instat	root	root
locale	root	root
localectl	root	root
localedef	root	root
log2asc	root	root
log2long	root	root
logger	root	root
login	root	root
loginctl	root	root
logname	root	root
look	root	root
ls	root	root
lsattr	root	root
Isblk	root	root
Iscpu	root	root
lsipc	root	root
Islocks	root	root
Islogins	root	root root
Ismem		
Ismod	root	root
Isns	root	root
lspgpot	root	root
mawk	root	root
mcookie	root	root
md5sum	root	root
md5sum.textutils	root	root
mesg	root	root
migrate-pubring-from-classic-gpg	root	root
mkdir	root	root
mkenvimage	root	root
mkfifo	root	root
mkimage	root	root
mknod	root	root
mksunxiboot	root	root
mktemp	root	root
mmcli	root	root
more	root	root
mount	root	root
mountpoint	root	root
mv	root	root
mx-interface-mgmt	root	root
mx-ver	root	root
namei	root	root
nawk	root	root
ncal	root	root
netstat	root	root
networkctl	root	root
newgrp	root	root
nice	root	root
nisdomainname	root	root
nl	root	root
nm	root	root

Software Process for		
Non-Adminstrator	UID	GID
nmcli	root	root
nm-online	root	root
nmtui	root	root
nmtui-connect	root	root
nmtui-edit	root	root
nmtui-hostname	root	root
nohup	root	root
nproc	root	root
nsenter	root	root
nstat	root	root
numfmt	root	root
objcopy	root	root
objdump	root	root
od	root	root
openssl	root	root
pager	root	root
partx	root	root
passwd	root	root
passe	root	root
pathchk	root	root
pdb3	root	root
pdb3.9	root	root
perl	root	root
perl5.32.1	root	root
peri5.32-arm-linux-gnueabihf	root	root
peribug	root	root
peridoc	root	root
perlivp	root	root
perithanks	root	root
-	root	root
pgrep piconv	root	root
pidof	root	root
pidwait	root	root
pinentry	root	root
pinentry-curses	root	root
ping	root	root
ping ping4		
ping4 ping6	root	root root
pingo pinky	root	root
phiky	root	root
pkaction		
pkexec	root root	root root
pkill	root	root
•	root	root
pkttyagent	root	
pl2pm		root
pldd	root	root root
pmap pod2btml		
pod2html	root root	root
pod2man pod2text	root	root
		root
pod2usage	root	root
podchecker	root	root
pr	root	root
printenv	root	root
printf	root	root
prlimit	root	root
prove	root	root

Software Process for		
Non-Adminstrator	UID	GID
ps	root	root
ptar	root	root
ptardiff	root	root
ptargrep	root	root
ptx	root	root
pv	root	root
pwd	root	root
pwdx	root	root
py3clean	root	root
py3compile	root	root
py3versions	root	root
pydoc3	root	root
pydoc3.9	root	root
pygettext3	root	root
pygettext3.9	root	root
python3	root	root
python3.9	root	root
ranlib	root	root
rbash	root	root
гср	root	root
rdebsums	root	root
rdma	root	root
readelf	root	root
readlink	root	root
realpath	root	root
renice	root	root
reset	root	root
resizepart	root	root
resolvectl	root	root
rev	root	root
rgrep	root	root
rlogin	root	root
rm	root	root
rmdir	root	root
routef	root	root
routel	root	root
rrsync	root	root
rsh	root	root
rsync	root	root
rsync-ssl	root	root
rtstat	root	root
runcon	root	root
run-parts	root	root
rview	root	root
rvim	root	root
savelog	root	root
scp	root	root
script	root	root
scriptlive	root	root
scriptreplay	root	root
sdiff	root	root
sed	root	root
select-editor	root	root
sensible-browser	root	root
sensible-editor	root	root
sensible-pager	root	root
seq	root	root
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Software Process for	UID	GID
Non-Adminstrator		
setarch	root	root
setfacl	root	root
setpriv	root	root
setsid	root	root
setterm	root	root
sftp	root	root
sg	root	root
sh	root	root
sha1sum	root	root
sha224sum	root	root
sha256sum	root	root
sha384sum	root	root
sha512sum	root	root
shasum	root	root
shred	root	root
shuf	root	root
size	root	root
skill	root	root
slabtop	root	root
slcan_attach	root	root
sican_attach	root	root
slcanpty	root	root
sleep	root	root
slogin	root	root
snice	root	root
sort	root	root
splain	root	root
split	root	root
SS	root	root
ssh	root	root
ssh-add	root	root
ssh-agent	root	ssh
ssh-argv0	root	root
ssh-copy-id	root	root
ssh-keygen	root	root
ssh-keyscan	root	root
stat	root	root
stdbuf	root	root
streamzip	root	root
strings	root	root
strip	root	root
stty	root	root
su	root	root
sudo	root	root
sudoedit	root	root
sudoreplay	root	root
sum	root	root
sync	root	root
systemctl	root	root
systemd	root	root
systemd-analyze	root	root
systemd-ask-password	root	root
systemd-ask-password systemd-cat	root	root
systemd-cgls	root	root
systemd-cgtop	root	root
systemd-delta	root	root
systemd-detect-virt	root	root

Software Process for	UID	GID
Non-Adminstrator		
systemd-escape	root	root
systemd-hwdb	root	root
systemd-id128	root	root
systemd-inhibit	root	root
systemd-machine-id-setup	root	root
systemd-mount	root	root
systemd-notify	root	root
systemd-path	root	root
systemd-resolve	root	root
systemd-run	root	root
systemd-socket-activate	root	root
systemd-stdio-bridge	root	root
systemd-sysusers	root	root
systemd-tmpfiles	root	root
systemd-tty-ask-password-agent	root	root
systemd-umount	root	root
tabs	root	root
tac	root	root
tail	root	root
tar	root	root
taskset	root	root
tee	root	root
tempfile	root	root
test	root	root
testj1939	root	root
tic	root	root
timedatectl	root	root
timeout	root	root
tload	root	root
toe	root	root
top	root	root
touch	root	root
tpm2	root	root
tpm2_activatecredential	root	root
tpm2_certify	root	root
tpm2_certifycreation	root	root
tpm2_certifyX509certutil	root	root
tpm2_changeauth	root	root
tpm2_changeeps	root	root
tpm2_changepps	root	root
tpm2_checkquote	root	root
tpm2_clear	root	root
tpm2_clearcontrol	root	root
tpm2_clockrateadjust	root	root
tpm2_commit	root	root
tpm2_create	root	root
tpm2_createak	root	root
tpm2_createek	root	root
tpm2_createpolicy	root	root
tpm2_createprimary	root	root
tpm2_dictionarylockout	root	root
tpm2_duplicate	root	root
tpm2_ecdhkeygen	root	root
tpm2_ecdhzgen	root	root
tpm2_ecephemeral	root	
tpm2_ecephemeral tpm2_encryptdecrypt		root
tpm2_eventlog	root	root
tpmz_eventiog	root	root

Software Process for		
Non-Adminstrator	UID	GID
tpm2_evictcontrol	root	root
tpm2_flushcontext	root	root
tpm2_getcap	root	root
tpm2_getcommandauditdigest	root	root
tpm2_geteccparameters	root	root
tpm2_getekcertificate	root	root
tpm2_getrandom	root	root
tpm2_getsessionauditdigest	root	root
tpm2 gettestresult	root	root
tpm2_gettime	root	root
tpm2 hash	root	root
tpm2_hierarchycontrol	root	root
tpm2_hmac	root	root
tpm2_import	root	root
tpm2_incrementalselftest	root	root
tpm2 load	root	root
tpm2 loadexternal	root	root
tpm2_makecredential	root	root
tpm2_nvcertify	root	root
tpm2_nvdefine	root	root
tpm2_nvextend	root	root
tpm2_nvincrement	root	root
tpm2_nvread	root	root
tpm2_nvreadlock	root	root
tpm2_nvreadpublic	root	root
tpm2_nvsetbits	root	root
tpm2_nvundefine	root	root
tpm2_nvwrite	root	root
tpm2_nvwritelock	root	root
tpm2_pcrallocate	root	root
tpm2_pcrevent	root	root
tpm2_pcrextend	root	root
tpm2 pcrread	root	root
tpm2_pcrreset	root	root
tpm2_policyauthorize	root	root
tpm2_policyauthorizenv	root	root
tpm2_policyauthvalue	root	root
tpm2_policycommandcode	root	root
tpm2_policycountertimer	root	root
tpm2_policycphash	root	root
tpm2_policyduplicationselect	root	root
tpm2_policylocality	root	root
tpm2_policynamehash	root	root
tpm2_policynv	root	root
tpm2_policynvwritten	root	root
tpm2 policyor	root	root
tpm2_policypassword	root	root
tpm2_policypcr	root	root
tpm2_policyrestart	root	root
tpm2_policysecret	root	root
tpm2_policysigned	root	root
tpm2_policytemplate	root	root
tpm2_policyticket	root	root
tpm2_print	root	root
tpm2_quote	root	root
tpm2_rc_decode	root	root
tpm2_readclock	root	root
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tpm2_readeuplicrootroottpm2_sadecryptrootroottpm2_selfestrootroottpm2_selfestrootroottpm2_selfestrootroottpm2_selfestrootroottpm2_selfestrootroottpm3_sectorerootroottpm3_setorerootroottpm3_setorerootroottpm3_setorerootroottpm3_setorerootroottpm3_startautheesionrootroottpm3_startaut		UID	GID
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tpm2_selftestrootroottpm2_selftestrootroottpm2_selftestrootroottpm3_sectookanadauditstatusrootroottpm3_sectookanadauditstatusrootroottpm3_setormandauditstatusrootroottpm3_setormandauditstatusrootroottpm3_setormandauditstatusrootroottpm3_setormandauditstatusrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm3_startauthsessionrootroottpm1_startauthsesrootroottpm2_startauthsessionrootroottpm2_startauthsesrootroottpm3_startauthsesrootroottpu4_startauthsesrootroottpu5_startauthsesrootroottpu5_startauthsesroot<			
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which	root	root
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who	root	root
whoami	root	root
wpa_passphrase	root	root
write	root	root
write.ul	root	tty
xargs	root	root
xsubpp	root	root
xxd	root	root
yes	root	root
ypdomainname	root	root
zcat	root	root
zcmp	root	root
zdiff	root	root
zdump	root	root
zegrep	root	root
zfgrep	root	root
zforce	root	root
zgrep	root	root
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zless	root	root
zmore	root	root
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